A Novel Frame of Reverence

How Science can Change the WHOLE world

Oct 31, 2023

COMMUNICATING SCIENCE: A NOVEL FRAME OF REVERENCE

By Rich Blundell January 9, 2009
SUNY Buffalo, School of Education; Department of Learning and Instruction

Abstract: ......................................................................................................................... v Preface: ........................................................................................................................... 1 INTRODUCTION: ......................................................................................................... 9 RESEARCH SCOPE AND APPROACH:..................................................................... 18

Research Plan:........................................................................................................... 25 Positivism – Constructivism Integration: ................................................................... 26 Transactional Analysis: ............................................................................................. 36

Other Paradigmatic and Theoretical Commitments:................................................... 36 Axiological Setting:................................................................................................... 40

TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS: ................................................................................ 45 Introduction:.......................................................................................................... 46

The Natural Sciences: ............................................................................................ 48

Science Studies...................................................................................................... 51 Worldview Theory: ............................................................................................... 55 Communicative Action:......................................................................................... 60 Conceptual Change: .............................................................................................. 62 Transformative Learning theory: ........................................................................... 63 Affective Domain and Motivation: ........................................................................ 66 Cognitive Metaphor Theory:.................................................................................. 67 Embodied Cognition:............................................................................................. 70 Humanities: ........................................................................................................... 72 Narrative: .............................................................................................................. 74 Performance Culture:............................................................................................. 75

iii

Phenomenology:.................................................................................................... 76 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS:............................................................................... 77

A Novel Frame of Reverence: ................................................................................... 79 Endnote:........................................................................................................................ 82 References: ................................................................................................................... 88

Abstract:

Scientists, science educators, and communicators commit an enormous amount of effort to promote science literacy but the evidence suggests that we consistently fail to produce results that scale with the investment. Thus there is a growing motivation to call on informal science communication to contribute to the goal of improving the public understanding of science. Since constructivist approaches to formal science pedagogy are one area that has seen modest success, this project seeks to develop a more theoretically founded constructivist approach to informal science communication. The research specifically addresses the public perception of science by focusing on phenomenological and affective responses to science content.

It is reasoned that the prevailing “two-culture” antagonism between science and the humanities manifests ultimately in an underappreciated spectrum of personal, cultural, and environmental ills. By suggesting links to science literacy and negative perceptions of science, this research may offer insights to improve the human condition. As the research advanced from theory to practice it evolved by necessity into an endeavor to vertically integrate science and the humanities. The result is a practical framework for science communication that is; based on existing knowledge because it is transacted from accepted resources; boundary-crossing because it integrates insights from across disciplinary divides; and pragmatic because it is negotiated directly from the cultural problems previously linked to negative perceptions of science. The conclusions of this study may be especially useful for improving communication of science to the public, informal science education, and science for non-science majors.

Preface:

This thesis culminates the author’s participation in the first-ever cohort of the SUNY-CFI Master’s of Education program on Science and the Public (SAP). According to the program’s online documentation, its goal is to “explore the broader philosophical, social, and cultural implications of the methods and cosmic outlook of the sciences.” The documentation goes on to describes how “the project concerns both the public understanding of science in the narrower sense as well as the broader self-reflection that every modern society must undertake” (Dacey, 2007, pp. Science and the Public, Introduction, para. 1). The research presented in this paper is designed to examine that area of inquiry deliberately and precisely.

For this project I have been immersed in an exhaustive and rigorous survey of science education literature. Through this work I developed a sense that there is a large community of dedicated and innovative people, desperate to improve the problem of low- science literacy. I’ve encountered a stream of bold creative ideas, a collaborative ethic of integrity, and even a few rounds of inspirational altruism. But most often the endeavor felt like a deficit-driven odyssey of frustration. The deficit-driven aspect I shall return to shortly. But when I take a moment to step back, and look at the science literacy dilemma from a distance, it occurs to me how incredibly paradoxical the problem really is – so much so that we fail to not even see its complete absurdity. There are currently dispersed around the globe, in aggregations small and large, tens, if not hundreds of thousands of intelligent, dedicated, and highly educated human beings, endowed with the vast creative

resources of a diversity of intellectual and cultural perspectives, all keenly focused on this issue of science literacy. Yet an undeniable solution continues to elude us. Even though the movement is still somewhat disorganized and uncontained, considering its scale, one could argue that this problem receives and consumes the greatest collective mental focus of any human endeavor ever undertaken. This is, of course, a claim impossible to verify scientifically. But even so, those of us who have taken on the task of teaching and communicating science would agree there is a deep problem and most of us are as deeply and personally committed to the task. While we enjoy the privilege of seeing and being a part of a movement we continually witness the untapped potential of the scientific way of thinking writ large. Some of us understand what Ann Druyan calls the “soaring spiritual high that comes from grasping science's central revelation - our oneness with the cosmos” (Druyan, 2006). But then we all to often carry the burden of watching our goals go unrealized. Some of us go further to illuminate the problem, as I have tried to do in this thesis, to find ways of connecting the tragedy of unnecessary human and non-human suffering as an issue of the general negative or inappropriate, perceptions of science.

To return to the aforementioned single most glaring summation of my literature analysis - the feeling of it being deficit-driven - I can confirm a well-developed science-humanities antagonism. One way it continually expressed itself was as the struggle to design a research plan that fit within purview and format of what I was reading – primarily science pedagogy research. By admitting that I may have failed in this regard, is, however, a realization of the crux of the problem. That something profoundly unifying was missing

from everything I read compelled me to dig deeper. This thesis is an attempt to articulate what I eventually uncovered.

I undertook this project as a personal response to a lifelong abiding concern for the human condition. To me it is perfectly clear what needs to happen for this world to be a better place. People, lots of people, need to undergo a transformation in fundamental identity that changes the way they think about themselves and their relations with the natural order. I’ve felt the transformation in myself, seen it occur many times in my clients, students, friends and family. It occurs under certain conditions. For my clients the process had begun before they came under my care. It is why they sought me out as the guide to show them Africa. They were already primed, and just needed the proper context for their epiphanic moment; often the summit of a mountain, the banks of a stream, or in the field of view of some big predatory cat. For the rest it was a more drawn out and variable process. But what they all had in common was an extended period of time, punctuated in sequence with just the right kind of moments. The moments of acute awareness surrounded by the right frame of mind, authentic enough, and safe enough, so that I could personally demonstrate something. This project is about understanding the raw materials of an epiphany – the best context, structure, and process. About approaching an understanding of the sequence of inputs, the language, the tone, and the timing of a transformative event and making these new insights available to communicators.

I also discovered that I am not alone in thinking that the most critical ills of our time, find root in the human propensity to believe what we want to believe and to assign our most personal of meanings according to comfortable and partly culturally received patterns of thought and action. I suspect that this “wishful thinking” comes at the expense of, or in avoidance of a critical self-reflection that when writ large on society, manifests as unnecessary suffering. Thus a sense of urgency compelled me to wonder if we may be overlooking some deeper, untapped aspect of science. A value system, or self-identity, derived through science and it’s cosmic-scale broadened perspectives, but always rooted in human-scale love and empathy. I sought an ethic too big for scientific knowledge and technology alone, un-tethered to human experience. I also wondered if it would be possible to take a decidedly radical stance on a subject such as science education, it being so burdened with all of the requirements of science, without slipping down any of the “strong form” slopes of logical positivism or social constructivism. It is after all, an intellectually and professionally treacherous landscape with pockets of resistance behind every little hill. But it is a landscape that must be crossed.

Any project seeking to examine science and society, ethics, and values, is destined to come head to head with religion. I do not cast undue blame on science or any religion, but I did want to ask: if science and its technology are so powerful in improving the human condition, why is there so much suffering in the world today? And if religion and its humanitarian values are so powerful in improving the human condition, why is there so much suffering in the world today? If science and religion, described by Edward O. Wilson as; “the two most powerful forces in the world today” (Wilson, 2006), have each

been duly committed in their respective magisteria toward improving the human condition, then why is there still so much suffering in the world today? Perhaps this two- way systemic failure was an opportunity to reexamine the science-humanity divide in ways that allowed new patterns of thinking to emerge.

As this project is an exercise in problem solving, it is imperative to know what the problem is. I link the problem to a lack of critical self-reflection and science literacy. This is not to be confused with the common “deficit model” of science literacy which implies that if the scientific community would just better communicate what it is they do, then the public would automatically come to appreciate and support science (Miller, 2001). Miller’s deficit model is assumed to be one of quantity, whereas I characterize the deficit more as “qualitative misalignment.” A brief analogy may help illustrate the difference.

Firefighters are trained to manage different types of fires in different ways. Imagine that an electrical fire breaks out in a standard residential outlet and then quickly spreads to the internal wooden frames of the wall. Firefighters arrive and quickly apply a stream of water that effectively douses the flames. The immediate problem is solved. However, if no further action is taken, and the fire department leaves, it would not be surprising that the fire would reignite as soon as the area dries out. Imagine that the flames do return, as do the firefighters, but this time they use CO2 extinguishers to suffocate the fire. Once the flames disappear, again the firefighting effort stops and they depart the scene. In a short while, as oxygen infuses back into contact with the combustible materials, the flames flare back into action. This time the firefighters return with a chemical

extinguisher using high-tech fire retardant powder, and once again the flames are extinguished. Perhaps it is clear by now that the flames will return and by now the structural integrity of the entire house has been weakened (not to mention the municipal firefighting budget). Why? Because we never addressed the problem at the source level. If on the first call, the squad had simply dispatched a rookie to the basement, to flip the breaker switch, this wasteful, risky, and ineffective sequence could have been avoided. This analogy would be obviously absurd, if it were not for the fact that it in some ways it resembles our approach to the science literacy problem. A case in point could be the so- called creation-evolution debate. In this analogy, think of the original Anglican resistance by Darwin’s contemporaries as the first call to the fire department. After the initial flare up was doused, the flames returned as the 1925 Scopes trials. After suffocating the flames through legislation, they re-flared as Creationism in the 1999 Kansas State Board of Education only to be extinguished for good. Except the flames re-ignited as Intelligent Design in Ohio, to be extinguished, and then reignited as “teach the controversy” in Pennsylvania, etc. Shall we continue ad absurdum? By now the appropriate question should now be clear. Where is the breaker switch and how can we flip it? These are the kinds questions asked by this project.

“There is an optimistic view of the human condition that can be maintained and that is consistent with Darwinism, but it is not the one that allows conceptual stability." In other words, we need a conceptual crisis. "...letting the insights of cognitive science and universal Darwinism complete their transformation of our folk concepts and then seeing what remains." (Stanovich, 2004, p. ix).

The problem may be better understood if framed as a deficit in empathy rather than a deficit in education. This research will argue that unless we retrace the origins of our misaligned efforts far enough back, we’ll repeatedly fail to solve the “problem” because we simply fail to address it on a sufficiently deep level. That is a central conceit of this project.

Truly effective communication shares many of the same fundamental challenges, techniques, and goals, as education. Both use symbols, language, and affective means to impart cognitive and conceptual change. For the same reasons, both have also been successfully turned to as mechanisms for social change. Many view communication and education as two sides of the same coin. As a matter of urgency, this research applies its efforts toward the communication of science to the public, instead of education. Although much of the insight generated by this work will be applicable to educational settings, I agree with the scholarly consensus that a “top-down” institutional approach would be overly burdened with political and bureaucratic obstacles. This project seeks a more direct and personally engaged route. It is a decision well supported by current events. Even during the final write-up, drastic political, economic, and environmental news made it difficult to keep pace with the cultural scale changes underway. Therefore it makes sense that this work be cast as broadly and urgently as possible and communication to the public seems to offer the best route. This project is just one part of an earnest personal attempt to address our critical ills at their most fundamental level –the patterns of human

thought and action. This is, of course, a daunting task beyond the scope of single graduate student, but one must try, even if only in the smallest of ways.

INTRODUCTION:

Science has been a formidable human endeavor. As a way of interrogating nature it has revealed previously unimaginable truths about the way the universe works. As a methodological process it has also provided the products, technology, and systems to immensely improve the quality of human life. Yet paradoxes abound. The negative consequences, as well as the benefits of science have become two of the hallmarks of human progress. Science is at the heart of both degrading and depleting, and protecting and healing the environment that sustains us. Democracy is predicated on the notion of an informed citizenry, capable of making scientifically wise decisions, but a misinformed public can have widely tragic consequences. Global economies depend on a continually flowing pipeline of scientists and technological innovation, but that innovation can lead to unsustainable patterns of consumption and a disconnect with the suffering that consumption can cause. Over time, the choices we are obliged to make become increasingly complicated and burdened with more drastic and unpredictable results that will require more and more science. As the social world flattens, personal ideologies and political agendas are enabled to clash or play instantly across oceans and cultures. Classic worldviews that once served their owners well in isolation may now require longer-term critical thinking and a tolerance for diversity that has thus far went undeveloped. Given its enormous role in getting us here, it seems reasonable to ask if science may now have something more to offer us? Something we are overlooking, something more than knowledge and technology? Something ineffable but profoundly transformative in the way we perceive ourselves and the world we interact with. That is the primary question of this project.

It was the British scientist and novelist C. P. Snow, who referred to the split between science and the humanities as the “two cultures” divide. In 1963 he wrote:

I believe the intellectual life of the whole of western society is increasingly being split into two groups. When I say the intellectual life, I mean to include also a large part of our practical life, because I should be the last person to suggest the two can at the deepest level be distinguished... Between the two a gulf of mutual incomprehension--sometimes (particularly among the young) hostility and dislike, but most of all lack of understanding... This polarisation is sheer loss to us all. To us as people, and to our society. It is at the same time practical and intellectual and creative loss, and I repeat that it is false to imagine that those three considerations are clearly separable (Snow, 1963).

There is little disagreement that the two culture still exist in common resistance and that science is the one with a public image problem. Among scientists, science educators and communicators, this much is common knowledge. There is also a vast amount of research that has documented consistent declines in science literacy and attitudes (Allum, Sturgis, Tabourazi, & Brunton-Smith, 2008; Bauer, Allum, & Miller, 2007; Good & Shymansky, 2001; Hanrahan, 1999; Hazen & Trefil, 1991; Linder, Ostman, & Wickman, 2007; Mayer, 2002; Millar, 2007; Miller, 2001; Pardo & Calvo, 2002, 2004; Project 2061 AAAS, 2001). There is also no shortage of literature documenting the challenges of stimulating science literacy in the United States (Hazen & Trefil, 1991; Mayer, 2002;

Millar, 2007; Project 2061 AAAS, 2001; Shamos, 1995). There seems to be an ineffable disconnect between what we know, and what we achieve. One gets the palpable sense that content-centered assessments such as these, which reflect the institutional agendas of standard schools, industry and consumer society, are missing the most salient parameter. Does the disparity between low test scores and high productivity highlight some glaring oversight?

One reasonable explanation is that pure knowledge, content-centered is not a valid measure of practical intelligence. If so, then why are we wedded to it? If the philosophers of political power are correct, then we truly do live in “interesting” times. In any case, this issue resides outside the scope of this project,

There is also a cacophony of calls for educational reform in science education. One particularly frustrating and frequently heard bemoanment is for the return of a “science of enhancement.” All too often however, this cry goes unanswered. Often it’s because of the professional and political risk inherent in humanizing science. The very thought of it goes against the central tenet of the revered scientific objectivity – a source of tension that should not be trivialized.

There are trends that acknowledge that the education for public understanding of science requires more than the acquisition of knowledge, even about other cultures, the state of the planet, and critical thinking and social action skills. To be truly effective, science education must develop the capacities of caring, concern and commitment; qualities

which currently reside outside the usual umbrella of science (Hassard & Weisberg, 1999, p. 742)

There is a well-known but informal mantra in science education that claims; “to know science is to love it”. That is to say, the more one knows about science, the more favorable one’s attitude towards it will be. Regrettably, from this point of view at least, publics both in Europe and in the USA appear to possess depressingly low levels of scientific knowledge. (Sturgis & Allum, 2004, p. 56). So this research will explicitly retain the inverse notion; “to love science is to want to know science.” It is an issue of motivation. To employ science obviously we must understand science. But to understand science we must love science. Scientists love science. But does the public? And if the public does not love science, how can we expect our public servants (politicians) to? This project aims to develop novel routes for the enculturation of a deeper appreciation based on “higher order values” of science in the public.

Deriving the Higher Order Values of Science:

The goal of this section is to articulate a basis for deriving a set of “higher order values of science. ”In October 2007 the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies convened a seminal conference wherein the participants set out to diagnose what they saw as the most pressing environmental issues of our time and to begin the search for cures. Their report, titled Toward a New Consciousness: Values to Sustain Human and

Natural Communities, cites an expansive set of maladies that includes: hyper- individualism, narcissism, social isolation, parochialism, sexism, prejudice, ethnocentrism, materialism, consumerism, the primacy of possessions, limitless hedonism, and gross economic, social and political inequality (Leiserowitz & Fernandez, 2008). There is a dissonance in this list that should not be lost to the reader. The Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies is a world-renown institution, highly regarded in scientific and interdisciplinary research. If one assumes environmental solutions are primarily science-based, why then is the list of issues generated by an environmental conference be so overwhelmingly infused with personal, social, and cultural language? Any objective interpretation of this conference report is obliged to conclude that the solutions to environmental problems are not scientific or technological, but most certainly ideological, social, and cultural – all manifestations of the personal, just writ large. The list suggests a new set of values is needed and they may be called up from what science has to tell us.

The Yale list highlights a sort of ideology-reality mismatch. In broad, and deliberately vague language, one might say that the human conceptualization of itself, needs to change as it has now begun to come into contact with the reality of that conceptualization.

Cast in a science education context, the question then becomes, can and should science education equip us with more than just positivistic knowledge? If so, what? Cast in a cultural context, might the core causes of critical ills correlate to deficiencies in modern

positivistic science attitude and perception? What is missing that seems to be at the heart of social ills? Can these “deficiencies” be added to science education for beneficial effect? Let this be the starting point of this project; the realization that fundamental changes must occur.

There is considerable collective voice claiming we have cumulative systemic critical ills before us. Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider approach the situation from the humanities, summarizing the advance of civilization in terms of technological risk (Beck & Sznaider, 2006). In their interpretation, if science continues to advance in society, as it has to date, technological experiments will become effectively conducted on the scale of civilizations. If that is the case, then one failed hypothesis translates into the collapse of a civilization. The point is that the controls are no longer in control and what used to be manageable experimental unpredictability, transforms into existential crisis. Now is an important time to be addressing our critical ills.

This study accepts the possibility that our fundamental way of thinking about ourselves must change. That we must move from conceptions of ourselves, individually and collectively, as distinct and insulated from the natural world to being integral, relational, actors that ultimately receive what we put out. What we do to nature we do to ourselves. The question then becomes; what role can science as knowledge and narrative in constructing new internal cognitive and affective structures play? It is a matter of expanding the values of science to incorporate human values. As careful examination of the history and philosophy of science, this thesis has some profound insights to offer.

Consider the following statements based on the positivist outlooks:

Science provides the Knowledge it needs to solve its problems. Science provides the Technology it needs to solve its problems. Science provides the Epistemology for solving its problems.

These three values statements can be considered the traditional “lower order values of science. ”Statement one highlights the facts of science. Statement two highlights the products of science. And statement three highlights the process of science. Essentially, the entire current formal understanding of science is contained in these three positivist oriented statements -all of which, most scientists would agree, are true. It should be noted then, that science education and the common cultural conceptualization of science, have evolved essentially lock-step alongside these three successive understandings of science. This research now argues that that these three values alone have become inadequate, indeed maladaptive, for long-term human survival.

Given the nature of our most critical ills, especially as they are characterized by the Yale report, it now seems reasonable then to define a preliminary set of “Higher-order values of science”.

Consider the following statements based on the constructivist outlook:

Science provides the Perspective needed to accurately grasp human impact, accomplishment, rarity and improbability.
Science provides access to novel and deeper sources of Personal Meaning by empowering the individual to better understand the world and to participate in the narrative of science in meaningful ways

Science is a uniquely human endeavor that can provide a potential source for human

Purpose.

Thus for example, we may now consider three novel values of science; perspective, personal meaning, and purpose, as well as the worldviews and actions that would stem from them, to build constructivist pedagogical and communication approaches. By traversing from the positivist to the constructivist realms, we tempt a boundary-crossing move from the sciences to the humanities. And by not abandoning science, we may have also opened up opportunities for consilience across the divide.

Historians of all disciplines are well versed in the mindset of looking to the past in order to understand the present. Within the humanities, art history for example, the evolution of aesthetics and creative forces has played an integral role in the interpretation and contemporary critique. Intriguingly, there is also a slowly growing population of humanists that are beginning to look, however tentatively, to integrate empirical science into their interpretations. The basic trend however is still one of reluctance, if not repulsion (Slingerland, 2008) but there may be hope for meeting in some middle ground. Unfortunately, and for good reasons which we shall discuss further on, the same cannot

be said of science. But today, very little from the history of science is applied to our interpretation of the scientific issues of the day. A consistent theme throughout this project is one that resists unnecessary or counter-productive dichotomies. It is reasoned that some of the fundamental criterion for good science practice, create a paradox for the communication of science to the public. This is certainly not a new idea. It is a symptom of deeply entrenched dichotomies. Dichotomies such as that between science vs. the humanities, science vs. art, and objective vs. subjective. As this project undertakes the historically intractable goal of integrating these two disparate worldviews, a considerable amount of discussion is devoted to support the process. The dichotomy most closely aligned with the goals of this study is that between the positivist and constructivist models of reality, which will be dissected in more detail below.

This thesis seeks to recreate some of the progress made in constructivist pedagogy and bring those insights into the public sphere. It is reasoned that the communication of science to the public whether by scientists, informal science educators, journalists and other science communicators, is best poised to deliver the changes we consider crucial for the changes many of us envision.

RESEARCH SCOPE AND APPROACH:

“We learn that from the prior position, the posterior view is absurd or preposterous – the new position so utterly at odds with “current” understanding that only the mentally deranged would consider it plausible”

-- James Sage (2003) on van Frassen’s “The Empirical Stance”

A primary goal of this project is a framework for insight and praxis to inform a novel conceptualization of science that is more amenable to human communication. That is, a structure to guide and promote personally constructed responses to the narratives of science, as opposed to just accumulated positivistic scientific knowledge.

The first research goal then is to articulate a conceptualization of science based on an extended set of values for science. An imperative is to reframe novel values to be associates with science without sacrificing the validity, or overstating the power of science. These values, defined here as “higher-order values of science”, should be founded upon accepted scientific knowledge and praxis, and emerge pragmatically from the problems of humanity. Since the higher-order values should encourage deep personal meaning making, there is a clear motivation to move away from purely positivist approaches, and towards a more humane constructivist conceptualization of science.

This section documents an extensive process of situating the current study in what James Crotty calls a “culture of inquiry” (Crotty, 1998). The analytical effort of this research centers on an interdisciplinary technique called “Transactional Reading” wherein scholarly texts and other sources are engaged in a critical and creative mode to develop new meaning (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000) It is a methodological approach that promotes novel insights; allowing them to emerge pragmatically and pre-contextualized to the problems for which solutions are sought (previously defined as “critical ills”).

As this study concerns itself with cultural forces and phenomena, the reigning cultural context is an important consideration. In this case, this generally means a focus on developed western industrial and consumer cultures. As the global landscape has flattened, the science literacy argument has acquired invigorated warnings about global competitiveness and the economic needs for a full-flowing technology/technologist pipeline (Dacey, 2007; Millar, 2007; National Science Board. 2006. Science and Engineering Indicators, 2006; Project 2061 AAAS, 2001). Although there may be nothing inherently wrong with the rationality behind these arguments to support science, the volume of negative science-literacy reports suggests they alone may no longer be adequate. Although this thesis acknowledges the importance of content knowledge and questions regarding the minimum core requirements in order to make scientifically literate decisions, it recognizes the potential pitfalls of “putting the cart before the horse.” That is, putting science knowledge and technology before sustainable values. Without a valid foundation from which to adequately address the cultural hindrances to science

literacy, the fire of negative attitudes toward science will return and we will continue to falter in both agendas. So this research asks deeper questions and seeks deeper answers.

There are perplexing inconsistencies for which content-based quantitative studies that are rooted in the standard “deficit model” approaches seem ill equipped to address. Recent findings suggest that science knowledge is highly contextual, and only weakly predictive of a positive perception of science (Sturgis & Allum, 2004). This finding, if valid, supports the notion that knowledge of science content alone is insufficient to foster a positive perception of science. If so, then the majority of institutional science education programs, as the legacy of post-war deficit models, are probably outmoded (Maxwell, 1987). This asymmetry suggests a fundamental discordance in the prevailing habits of our thinking about science and how science is integrated on socio-cultural levels. This is an area of inquiry addressed by the transactional meta-analysis conducted in the study.

The inherently complex and problematic nature described above is compounded (yet necessitated) by the fact that this study also required a boundary-crossing synthesis of theories. Thus an innovative postpositivist-constructivist approach needed to be rationalized. The benefit and utility of such a blend allowed this project to marshal the best of both worlds without sliding detrimentally into strong versions of either postmodern relativism or over-determined scientism.

In Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge, E.O. Wilson describes the postmodernist view and its alarming dissolution of integrity among the “literary intelligentsia” with the

conclusion that their “...truth is relative and personal. Each person creates his own inner world by acceptance or rejection of endlessly shifting linguistic signs. There is no privileged point, no lodestar to guide literary intelligence” (1998, p. 47). My hope is that this project, and in particular its approach to distilling a vast amount of theory, will at least bring some small measure of order to such a morass. And because the landscape is so vast and complex, fraught with the perils of academic ambiguity, opportunities for amateur naiveté, and intellectual dead-ends, there is a need for a hybrid framework to organize and guide the work. Easier said than done.

Some initial guidance was found under the rubric of Critical Theory, where there is an somewhat established pattern for pragmatic transaction. Charles Pierce, the originator of the Pragmatic Maxim, characterizes pragmatism as “that method of reflexion which is guided by constantly holding in view its purpose and the purpose of the ideas it analyzes... [and] having for its purpose to render ideas clear. (Peirce, CP 5.13 note 1, 1902). This is the basic form of transactional analysis applied in this study.

Additional structural and stylistic guidance for this process was found in at least two suitable templates. One, a master’s thesis titled Wild Practices: Teaching the Value of Wildness a master’s thesis by Christopher Linquist (Lindquist, 2004). The other was Craig Gemmel’s Doctoral dissertation titled: Untangling the Tangled Bank: Toward a Unitary Pedagogy of Nature (Gemmell, 2006). Both of these endeavors sought to increase the researchers clarity in understanding before departing into critical analysis, and both offer novel insights toward addressing similarly broad and complex problems.

The notion that science deals in objective truths (modern positivism) has been claimed by some as thoroughly discredited by a trifecta of advances in quantum, systems (Littledyke, 2008), and complexity theories (Kauffman, 2008). Thus, calls for innovation in science education literature and related subjects such as motivation (Glynn & Koballa Jr, 2006, p. 25) and educational psychology are on the rise. Still, the epistemology of science is generally thought of as ill-equipped for generating the kind of social values needed to address socially and culturally based ills (E. W. Taylor, 1997); (Shamos, 1995). This study questions if this view, as an artifact of enlightenment-age positivism, has imposed artificial limitations on the role of science in human affairs. In other words, would the liberation of new values of science, or scientific worldviews, offer new solutions?

This study will answer also the calls for research on improving science education. At the very least, it will introduce a bricolage of potentially new conceptualizations of science that extend the language and dialogue into higher-order value-realms. On a larger-scale, the implications of such a study might result in novel paths for the reverse enculturation of science. Since the insights and tools developed will emerge pragmatically from an abiding awareness of the problems we seek to address, the results of this study could provide valuable insight across global scale ills.

There is an inherent need for boundary work in this endeavor. Boundary, in this sense, refers to the demarcations between fields of knowledge and in particular the boundary that exists between science and the humanities. That the construction of boundaries

requires effort implies that they serve some purpose. The existence of a boundary also implies, indeed creates, a plurality of knowledge domains. Over the imaginative and creative tenure of human-scale thought, the result is a fractured landscape of sub domains, each populated by inhabitants who usually separate themselves from others by choice. Thus, most boundary-crossing projects meet scholarly resistance and become inherently difficult tasks. To take on the resistance will required a substantial intellectual process to sort out a manageable conceptual framework. The attempt to break down these barriers is as old as the barriers themselves. And the desire to naturalize ethics has deep intellectual roots as well. When David Hume tried in the 18th century he predicted we will “reject every system of ethics, however subtle or ingenious, which is not founded on fact and observation ” (2004, p. 6).

This project also draws on ideas in Critical Theory. Broadly speaking, Critical Theory is a Marxian Social Theory oriented toward critiquing and changing society as a whole (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2000). This contrasts with the positivist mode of theory, which is oriented only toward understanding or explaining phenomena. A useful refinement of Marxian Social Theory was articulated by Max Horkheimer who further distinguished Critical Theory to include radical emancipatory goals that extend the critique to both the model of science put forward by logical positivism and what he and his colleagues saw as the covert authoritarianism and orthodoxy of communism (Horkheimer, 1975). This formulation necessitated an opening up of the Marxian “social only” version and allowed the integration of all the major social sciences, including economics, sociology, history, political science, anthropology, and psychology. Something about this process of critical

self-reflection in the name of knowledge synthesis resonates with the core concepts and research approach of the current project.

This project is also by design a transactional endeavor and therefore falls under a Critical Theory rubric. Further, because the project seeks to “disrupt and challenge the status quo [to] ...emancipate and transform,” this project is firmly criticalist (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2000). Further still, since it demands and draws upon scientifically positivist knowledge for foundational data, it is objectivist. Yet, since it simultaneously advocates the idea that an individual’s “lived experience” is socio-culturally constructed; so it maintains a decidedly constructivist-interpretive outlook (Ponterotto, 2005). This is the nature of transactional integrative work.

The transactional part of Critical Theory officially embraced here, called Transactional Analysis, is one of contextualized assimilation of information with an abiding awareness of the broad-scale purpose of the research. It is an active seeking of novel insights that may be latent (or deficient) in the source text. Transactional Reading goes beyond the simple mechanical selections of conceptual resources to apply a creative force in a dynamic interaction. Indeed it is a method noted for it’s “constructive cross-fertilization” (1988, p. 17).

This research seeks to understand complex cultural-level issues and work toward global solutions. It is also meant to be both educative and prescriptive. Given these commitments, locating the study within a single suitable research paradigm has proven

problematic. If a research paradigm is defined as a “set of interrelated assumptions about the social world which provides a philosophical and conceptual framework for the organized study of that world” (Filstead, 1979), then the most appropriate research design is necessarily a hybrid that cuts across traditional paradigm-based methodologies.

So this investigation is designed to seek useful conceptual patterns across a logical trilogy of domains. Since this study is conducted from a pragmatic stance toward transformative ends, the analysis allows for patterns or theories to emerge. According to Denzin and Lincoln the present state of social research is a “...messy moment, full of multiple voices, experimental texts, breaks, ruptures, crises of legitimation and representation, self- critique, new moral discourses, and technologies..." (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. 1057). This thesis does not claim to clean up the mess, or even tidy up a bit. But it should at least help in expanding the dialog of problem solving through science.

Research Plan:

This section maps out a step-by-step plan for developing and illustrating the communicative framework. This task was non-trivial because the research sought to complete multiple tasks, on multiple levels, from multiple angles and across multiple disciplinary boundaries, all simultaneously.

The steps for this research are:

Derive the “higher order values of science” by rationalizing an expanded set of higher-order values of science that simultaneously makes science more amenable to human communication, bridges the dichotomy of antagonism between science and the humanities, and help ameliorate critical ills.
Develop a working model for positivism-constructivism integration.
Define and apply a boundary crossing methodological approach that will allow
novel insights to emerge pragmatically from a selection of existing resources.
Marshal relevant resources from across science and the humanities and conduct
the analysis.
Arrange the resources into a framework that incorporates the higher order values,
crosses boundaries, vertically integrates, and offers novel insight and praxis for the communications of science to the public.

The final section describes the framework, presents a graphic representation, and discusses the highlights, implementation ideas, and potential implications.

Positivism – Constructivism Integration:

The first step, to derive the “higher-order values of science” as perspective, personal meaning, and purpose, was completed in the introductory section. We now proceed to step two, developing a working model for the integration of positivism and constructivism. Developing an approach that could genuinely advance some meaningful insight or new knowledge required stepping back to survey a broad constellation of

research paradigms and methodologies. Two opposing paradigms stand out as most fundamental and pertinent. They are variously referred to as are positivism vs. constructivism, objectivism vs. subjectivism, science vs. humanities, or modernism vs. postmodernism. This study glosses over the subtle differences in each binomial pair to settle on positivism and constructivism as the default terms. The discussion that follows tracks how these opposing ideas have been negotiated to serve the research agenda.

At its core, positivism is the default idea that the world is real, that it can be posited, known through science, and experienced as distinct from the human mind. Positivism sees reality as “out there” in the “real world” existing unassailably to our thoughts yet still accessible to our senses and sciences. It is through these means that we can know and interact with the world. In positivism, human beings are the receivers of a stream of experience dictated by the outside world flowing in. Positivism and its goal, positivistic knowledge, were born and raised in the Enlightenment Era. Revered and protected as the most privileged form of knowledge, available only through observation, experimentation and the rigors of the newly invented form of investigation called science. In science, the mark of the investigator was best removed. When August Comte originally articulated his positivism in 1922, it was primarily an attempt to formalize the philosophy of scientific by removing the influence of metaphysics and put it use in sociology. He wrote: "Now that the human mind has founded celestial physics, terrestrial physics (mechanical and chemical), and organic physics (vegetable and animal), it only remains to complete the system of observational sciences by the foundation of social physics " (Comte, 1988, p. 13). Comte’s positivism was further refined by the Vienna philosophical school to

incorporate logic. In the hands of Popper and Kuhn, Logical positivism flourished to become the de facto basis of the scientific method. The positivist position that has guided modern science through the 19th and 20th centuries has been under rigorous and credible scrutiny ever since.

Modern positivism, the notion that science alone deals in objective truths, has been met not only by cultural resistance, but is also now challenged by a more empirical trifecta of advances in quantum, systems, and chaos theories (Littledyke, 2008). These recent and well-reasoned philosophies are complements to earlier problems such as the limited generalizability of Popperian falsification and the Duheim-Quine challenge to scientific determination. Although some see these evolutionary events as a thorough discrediting of objectivity, and an opportunity to abandon positivistic science for the post-modern age (Grobstein , 2005), that is not the goal of this project. An attempt is made here to situate this research pragmatically; straddling the boundaries of positivism and constructivism by assuming that science does indeed advance toward valid natural knowledge as objectively as possible, but then as complex intellectual beings, we construct our responses to that knowledge. Once this view is adopted, it becomes clear how the epistemology of science is generally conceptualized as ill-equipped for generating the kind of social values needed to address socially and culturally based ills (Shamos, 1995). The present limited view of science, an artifact of enlightenment-age positivism, is argued to impose artificial limitations on the role of science in human affairs.

The “post” positivist outlook is that which holds the privileged veracity of scientific knowledge as just described, but along with the abiding awareness of the power of social forces to shape the direction and application of that knowledge. With care taken to avoid the extremes of postmodern underdetermination as well as the overdetermination of scientism, we can proceed toward the goal of positivist-constructivist integration. The intent of this statement is as much founded on epistemological commitments to science, as it is to fend off any charges of naive postmodern antirealism or cultural relativism. In this study, the post positivist assumption is applied universally, assuming that reality exists “all the way down” and “all the way up” for that matter, and is accessible only via science. But as a distinctly human endeavor, it is impossible to completely erase the human influence in science.

It is in this admission that this project must relinquish any claim to positivistic science. But then again it is does not posit any empirical truth claims. Instead this project incorporates the knowledge garnered through positivist science as its foundation, and then constructs a pragmatic argument, framed by culture, for improving how science is communicated.

The central conceit of this project then, is that the claim of true positivism is irrelevant, without a response to it. Whether reality exists or not is only a matter to ponder if we are here to interact with it. To be clear, positivist knowledge, gained through science, plays a foundational role. In this study, positivist means the naturalist’s logical positivism, replete with all the uncertainties and limitations of inductive epistemology. What matters

then, is the nature of our constructed response to the best available knowledge. We construct our response to positivist knowledge and call it real. Thus constructivism emerges for integration.

The changes as they have been implemented in the science pedagogy revolve around the growing acceptance of constructivist approaches. Even as the positivist legacy of enlightenment thinking still persists in certain pockets, today, constructivism enjoys a growing acceptance in educational theory and science education in particular. The primary theorist at the interface of science education and constructivism is the American philosopher and sociologist John Dewey. Dewey’s constructivism serves this project’s transformative agenda especially well because it draws a learners “willingness to change” out into the open (Dewey, 1916).

Dewey’s constructivist thinking has offered a deep well of insight for understanding the complexities of nature-culture interaction without having to abandon objective science. But as an area of intense intellectual speculation, it has also become a confusing morass of ideas and terms, fraught with opportunities to distract the amateur philosopher. Jim Garrison clarifies Dewey’s constructivist stance and reasserts the utility of Deweyan thinking. With one skillful swipe of Occam’s razor, Garrison shaves away the “needless subjectivism and mentalistic abstractions, thereby clearing the face of reasonable science education for genuine experimentalist and objective social constructivism” (Garrison, 1997, p. 553).

Garrison’s careful analysis of the Deweyan perspective on constructivism highlights the real value of the view. Kruckeberg (2006) then grasps the utility of Dewey’s links to conceptual change as based in experience. Kruckeberg’s articulation goes on to highlight a bigger and vastly more important question of why we should learn about science in the first place. This is a scale of interpretation that emphasizes science over other areas of study by articulating how it provides: “better representations of reality, better methods of investigation, better approaches to solving problems, better preparation for involvement in a technological society, and so on” (2006, p. 5). Kruckeberg also correctly values Deweyan constructivism in learning because it privileges scientific knowledge in a way that highlights the interaction between scientific concepts. In this light, constructivist views function to liberate thinking and foster broader connections to experience. He writes; “Through Dewey’s constructivism we learn science in order to become better relational, systems thinkers, and it is precisely the development of this habit of thinking that facilitates personal growth toward greater association with others and within the natural environment” (2006, p. 5)

Most theorists and practitioners understand the nuances and challenges of the constructivist-conceptual system and make thoughtful efforts to incorporate the current understanding of conceptual change. This distinction places emphasis on a learner’s affective response and the heightened ability to stimulate further inquiry. It also corresponds with Kruckeberg’s claim that unless “knowledge is not personally valued, it will not be meaningfully assimilated” (2006, p. 4).

The natural benefits of Dewey’s experiential, relational, and pragmatic constructivism are immense. At once science becomes the source and the means for making personally meaningful connections in experience and it encourages a pure interaction with the natural world; one that neither makes nor needs any a priori assumptions of dualism. Kruckeberg then succinctly identifies the cross-cultural value of Dewey’s philosophy when he concludes that it provides “a powerful theoretical framework for fostering student understanding in science that is sufficiently constructivist, avoids problems associated with a narrow focus on cognition and rationalist conceptual change” (2006, p. 6). One can clearly see the difference in the usual materialistic role for science education by comparing Kruckeberg’s understanding to the standard position - “Scientific Literacy is the matrix of knowledge needed to understand enough about the physical universe to deal with issues that come across our horizon in the news or elsewhere” (Trefil, 2007, p. 148).

This research argues that there is an un-mined niche for science communication that becomes clear when one compares the Kruckeberg interpretation with the opposite extreme of postmodern relativism in works such as (Cobern, 1993). In this article, the author discusses the impact of worldview on learning. Cobern sees worldview enculturation as a process wherein one identifies and acknowledges student worldview and then crafts science pedagogy in light of that worldview. This approach, though valid thus far, then abandons the hope of constructing a new worldview. This is the deficit in the deficit-driven model.

Furthermore, worldview theory, as we shall see, identifies “internal and external consistencies” and views education as a means to foster worldviews with higher degrees of "external consistency" (Kearney, 1984, p. 54). But the relativistic version of constructivism and “positivism” relied on in Cobern’s view reflects satisfaction with external consistency as long as it conforms to a particular dualistic worldview. Familiar patterns of Cobern’s thinking are implicit in passages such as “Therefore, there are occasions when the careful epistemological explication of a concept is not sufficient to bring about learning. The instruction must also include a discussion of the metaphysical foundations that support the epistemology” (1993, p. 6) In this interpretation, it seems belief trumps knowledge. Although much useful insight can be gleaned from Cobern’s insights on the utility of worldview theory and constructivist education, the current study rejects any constructivism that maintains externally inconsistent worldviews in students – no matter how entrenched they may be.

It is Dewey’s positivist-grounded transcendentalism then, that clarifies the impetus to do, learn, and communicate science in the first place. It also secures its central role in this study by revealing how much ground (read opportunity) there really is to traverse. If any idea can span the two-culture split, it is the Deweyan constructivist perspective outfitted with positivist epistemology and knowledge. This combination embraced in the current study.

The intent then, is to situate this study to span the nature-culture dichotomy without insulting either. The indulgence of a simple thought experiment reveals how a

constructivist stance may, for the time being, may be commensurable with a positivist commitment. One must simply delineate the external world from our response to it. The external world, of which we are continuous agents, offers postpositivist knowledge to which we construct a response. We are accountable, in reality, to the impacts of that construction. The knowledge we construct is as real as the reality to which it responds. Thus we fulfill our agency as constructors of reality. That is, the structures we construct internally, however ephemeral, are considered part of the “furniture of the universe” as much as those that seem externally real. Aside from the required entity grounding of this mental exercise, the reason for this formulation is to broaden the range of intellectual resources available for exploitation in the transactional analysis that follows. It’s an imperative for any endeavor that seeks to reach across paradigm boundaries such as the science-humanities or nature-culture dichotomies. This provisional system also offers particular usefulness in discussions about conceptual dynamics in education and communication without betraying science’s authority as the best source of knowledge.

The last sentence above is a central tenet and the delimiting power it provides for this inquiry and cannot be overstressed. So it is worth stating it again: this project does not seek a change in the practice of science. Instead it seeks a novel conceptualization of science, based on intrinsically valid positivist science that can promote the cultural assimilation of science we seek.

The term enculturation normally involves the projection of cultural values and norms onto some entity, usually a person or people. There is a directional assumption that

cultural elements flow from the culture toward the entity to be enculturated. This is the opposite direction sought in this research. This research seeks to promote the flow of the elements intrinsic to science (philosophy, values, ethics, perspective, knowledge, etc), onto the prevailing culture. Although it may be more accurate to state the distributive process would as “the enculturation of culture with science”, we shall simply refer to the process as the reverse enculturation of science.

Concluding this section we should notice that we have come full circle. By accepting the veracity of the empirically derived body of positivist knowledge and coupling it to the constructivist position, we have defined a stance suitable for the next steps, analysis and vertical integration. We have also cleared a path to examine the vast intellectual resources that have accumulated since the dawn of human thought. We are unencumbered by the traditionally divisive dichotomies. We proceed authorized by the constructivist notion that the way learners interpret and reinterpret their experience is central to learning, making meaning, and potential action. We simultaneously maintain that positivist knowledge is the most valid form of natural knowledge and is suitable as the basis of all that is to be learned. There are no overlapping magisteria. This theme of unification firmly discounts radical notions of scientism, structuralism, social constructivism, and postmodern relativism as well as any of the extreme genera that drive the wedge deeper into the cultural divide, and ultimately put a stop on inquiry. This cross-paradigmatic stance of post-positivism and pragmatic social constructivism opens this study up to the higher-level notions of consilience, emergence, critical-composition, and the integration required of boundary work.

Transactional Analysis:

To avoid distraction this study adopts a rule of thumb touch upon by E.O. Wilson when, in Consilience: and the Unity of Knowledge he wrote: “To the extent that philosophical positions both confuse and close doors to further inquiry, they are likely to be wrong” (1998, p. 47). Bearing that in mind with our minimal working model for positivism- constructivism integration in place, we may turn our attentions to adopting and refining a methodology suitable for synthesizing novel insights. The goal of the research is a practical framework for the communication of science that marshals insight and praxis from an existing network of theoretical and practical “resources”. The rest of the research sequence records a process for articulating a set of higher order values of science that are grounded in science but more amenable for human communication. That is, they should incorporate the tools and wisdom of the humanities as a means for transmission and enculturation. Thus the range of resources will span science and the humanities and allow for boundary crossing consilience.

Other Paradigmatic and Theoretical Commitments:

This section completes the task of scholarly housekeeping by acknowledging significant axiological concerns. The goal of this project is to negotiate across disciplinary boundaries. It seems prudent, then, to keep the boundary in sight until a way across becomes viable. This commitment mandates a rejection of strong forms of either

objective or subjective interpretations. In other words, a wide and somewhat malleable stance is a requisite of the nature of this inquiry. There is an immense amount of scholarly discussion tracking the benefits and pitfalls of one philosophical or another. This process, writ-large, is related to the “institutional reflexivity” called for by Beck and others (Beck, Ritter, & Lash, 1992; Grobstein , 2005; Littledyke, 1996; Maxwell, 2004).

This project commits to finding opportunities for consilience. Consilience is a term first coined by William Whewell, to refer to the linking, literally “jumping together” (Whewell, 1847) of inductive facts across disciplines to arrive at new explanatory theory. If we imagine the confirmation of knowledge drawn from facts convergent from laterally distributed disciplines, we have found an instance of consilience of the form described by E.O. Wilson (1998). When facts align across the disciplinary boundaries horizontally, they take on an added, holistic, explanatory power. But, along with that enhanced authority should come an equally expanded accountability. At present, consilience is not yet science or humanities. It floats in a “metaspace” between the natural sciences only. Yet it has a productive track record, and shows even more promise if it can find application in the social sciences and humanities. Although consilience does not yet conform to empirical tests or formal logic, Wilson places great hope in admitting “The strongest appeal of consilience is in the prospect of intellectual adventure and, given even modest success, the value of understanding the human condition with a higher degree of certainty” (1998, p. 9). Wilson’s challenge has been a challenge accepted here: to find hidden consilience in those old antagonisms between science and the humanities and then

use that authority to probe for chinks in the armor of both. The hope is that once consilience is found, it can be realized in novel ways of ameliorating critical ills.

Much work has been already been done and some progress made. The explanatory power of consilience as drawn from the natural sciences is still tenuous in some places, but a general explanatory network is beginning to emerge. Science is approaching the humanities tentatively, but at least with curiosity. The progress on the humanities side has been understandably more guarded. But the consilience heard in the natural sciences has an analogous structure in the Humanities that is beginning to sound through.

Cultural anthropologist Edward Slingerland approaches the science humanities split from the humanities side. In his book What Science Offers the Humanities (2008), he advises humanists to take the sciences seriously, especially the cognitive sciences. He frames Vertical Integration as an opportunity for “cross fertilization” between science and the humanities. In this scenario, the sciences offer the humanities an enhancement of the way they do business, by offering scientific insights into what goes on inside the brains of us.

The current project sought convergence on the same fertile ground, but from the opposite direction. The central question here asked what the humanities can offer science – not the practice of science, but the personal perception and cultural assimilation of the knowledge of science.

If I take a symmetrical approach, I would come to the conclusion that the humanities, properly informed by science, would save science from the Slingerland’s “bogeyman of reductionism” (2008). A real benefit because it provisions science communication with the vast tools, skills, and intellectual and aesthetic resources of the humanities.

The hierarchy ends up the same, with the humanities at the top. A humanities grounded in science implies a science communicated through the humanities. That is the nature of integration.

Rethinking the nature-culture or science-humanities divide necessarily requires rethinking present deontological and consequential reasoning. It seems there has been much expense of intellectual effort due to the superficial depth that cultural studies have been willing to draw for their explanatory theories of human behavior. Slingerland (Slingerland, 2008) provides an example of this when he describes Pierre Bourdieu’s concise and analytically rigorous, but intrinsically limited attempt to account for aesthetic “taste” by offering the notion of “habitus” as an unconscious but “active presence of the whole past of which it is the product” (Bourdieu 1990). Here Slingerland points out the forfeit of explanatory power in Bourdieu’s limited notion of the “whole past.” In this example, the entire project is needlessly reduced to social constructivism because it is content to dig as deep as personal cultural heritage as opposed to evolutionary scale heritage. Allowing the sciences, in this case evolutionary biology, to contribute to such a humanistic study would have avoided what Slingerland refers to as the “slide into cultural relativism.” This common limitation in cultural studies, Slingerland suggests, might

apply to the entire social constructivist paradigm: leaving it dead in the water at best, or zigzagging down an endless hall of mirrors at worst.

Axiological Setting:

According to Ponterotto, the axiology of social research refers to the “role of researcher values in the scientific process” (2005). Hence, I take this as the opportunity to present my values and opinions and I shall do so in the most explicit terms now. I believe human purpose has too long been hijacked by patterns of wishful thinking. And worse, it appears we’ve become blind to the cost of this comfortable self-delusion. I accept that this psychological habit is natural and in some ancestral form, may have served humanity in evolutionary valid ways. But it has now become maladaptive. If we are to mature in harmonious and prosperous ways, we must find fundamentally more fulfilling ways of envisioning ourselves as fully naturalized entities. In essence, and for a myriad of good reasons, I believe we have constructed a false dichotomy of humanity and nature. In this duality humans inhabit some supernatural realm separate and inaccessible to the natural realm. I recently described this sentiment to a religious friend with the phrase “There is no supernatural, it’s all natural.” To which she responded firmly “No, there is no natural, it’s all supernatural.” After a moment of reflection, I was surprised at my response “I’m ok with that” I don’t care what we call it, as long as we are it. So on this we could agree. The long destructive duel was suddenly solved by simple semantics. Something in this exchange made profound sense to me. The instance of embodiment made spirituality real, by viewing it as a valid, indeed necessary, part of human experience. So this research

aims to wrestle spirituality back from the ravages of dogma, through rhetoric if necessary, and re-release it to fix a maladaptive culture. It has become clear that the challenge is less about forming new concepts as it is about abandoning old outmoded ones. These are admittedly value-laden statements, but they are important to the research process and I am grateful for the opportunity to acknowledge them.

An assumption is made that that critical ills are at least partly rooted in inadequate conceptualization of science and that some of the qualities inherent to science, when writ large on society, will be fruitful in ameliorating critical ills. Today, our problems are much more complex and existential. I suggest that we are in need of new values and we will once again benefit from looking to science for them. What might these values be? I posit that several “higher-order values of science” such as personal meaning derived by scientific knowledge, the perspective of science, empathy rooted within the human- scientific narratives, and even science as purpose, are a good place to start. These are the new values of science that need to be developed and utilized hand in hand with the other enlightenment values of science such as knowledge, technology, and progress.

Throughout this study I assume a deficit stance. In other words, I take the status quo, as defined by the widespread bemoaning of low science literacy, to be sufficient evidence that something is not working. I also assume the current situation is unsustainable in the long-term, that progress has by and large, stagnated, and that the current situation is reflective of deeper flaws. Further, I contend, most of the current discussion fails to seek

deep enough solutions and that real changes can occur on levels deeper than pedagogy typically reaches.

I come from a science background. My studies in geology instill in me a deep respect for the power of science as an objective pursuit of knowledge. It is also a scientific discipline that underwent a classic Kuhnian paradigm shift within living memory and so offers a certain familiarity with the process. But geology, or more precisely, geologic time, presents the inherent opportunities for epiphanies of natural scale have become central to this thesis.

This is by definition a boundary-crossing endeavor that acknowledges Joan Robinson’s assertion that every human being has ideological, moral, and political views. To deny these views, she writes,

must be self-deception or a device to deceive others. A candid writer will make his preconceptions clear and allow the reader to discount them if he does not accept them. This concerns the professional honour of the scientist. But to eliminate the value judgments from the subject matter of social science is to eliminate the subject itself, for since it concerns human behavior it must be concerned with the value judgments people make. The social scientist (whatever he may privately believe) has no right to pretend to know any better than his neighbors what ends society should serve (Robinson, 1970, p. 122).

As a positivist scientist I admire the positivist virtue of emotional and ideological isolation from the foundational data. However, as a constructivist and critical theorist, I also accept the critical–ideological paradigm. That is, one of emancipation and transformation in which the researcher’s proactive values are central to the task, purpose, and methods of research. I also admire the inherent humility of scientific inquiry and the wonder of it all. Thus I seek an alternative conceptualization of science that will satisfy my own positivistic sense of credibility, while at the same time rescue purpose and the numinous from what I see as universal relativism.

I am proposing a cross-paradigmatic research design. Given the prolonged and personal engagement with the issues required to construct and express any insights of value, I will endeavor to bracket although not eliminate my values from the analysis. In fact, I fail to understand how isolating my values would be possible given that I am trying to compare and uncover new values. According to Ponterotto, as criticalist, I am bound to take this commitment a step further and “allow my explicit value biases shape, influence, and drive the research process and outcomes” (Ponterotto, 2005, p. 131). By accepting this fact, and admitting it explicitly, I believe I ultimately increase the emancipatory value of the project.

There is much discussion in the literature on the failure of science education, the paucity of science literacy, the dearth of critical thinking skills, etc. I understand the goals of science literacy promoters and join them in their quest. However, I fail to see anyone addressing truly root causes. This inquiry attempts to addresses root causes. This is not an

opinion but an observation. To be sure, I share the dream of culturally endemic science literacy, but if the current situation indicates the efficacy of our approaches to date, I see it follow that we are doing something wrong. It is ironic that a community so impressed by evidence, fails to accept that evidently, science literacy is not amenable to current science education.

I came to this conclusion through observation and philosophical reasoning. I agree with the many scholars, scientists, and other cultural leaders that there are global pernicious imbalances that are difficult to grasp in the scales of everyday experience. These imbalances may be explained if humans lack an evolutionary adaptation to perceive these problems and that the perspective of science could be an effective means for bringing them into consciousness. Science educators and communicators need to develop the language, acquire the skills, and find the will to instill adequate perceptions of natural- scales before we can address them effectively. My axiology manifests the higher order values of science that naturally and humbly precipitate from the ethos of science.

However, since my personal response to those objective findings, is inherently constructivist, there is the inevitability that my interpretations will be constructed as offensive to some existing ideologies. To address this potentially ethical concern, I explicitly state my subjectivist stance here. However, it should be noted, since my ultimate goals can be considered emancipatory, empathetic, compassionate, conservative, humanitarian, and globally altruistic, any objection to these goals should generate some value-questions in the objector (which is the goal after all).

This approach fully acknowledges the general thrust of the Duhem-Quine problem. By valuing the universals of worldview with reference to the multiple cultural settings in which they might exist, I hope to incorporate them from a position of ideological blindness. The goal, however impossible, is to assess them independently of culture and in the context of critical ills alone. As a consequence, this study claims to objectively support a plurality of worldviews. I am careful to acknowledge culture-bound value judgments but also to minimize them.

There is always the risk of what Kearny calls “idealization policy” which acknowledges a limited view of social reform toward some pre-established ideals (Kearney, 1984). Since my formulation of worldview acknowledges and promotes worldview diversity, the project is inherently pluralistic and philanthropic and anti-authoritarian. This endeavor is not about defining or acquiring absolute knowledge, but about unifying the pursuit of knowledge as a human endeavor, however incomplete and uncertain the epistemology or ontology may be.

TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS:

The greatest enterprise of the mind has always been and always will be the attempted linkage of the sciences and the humanities” – E.O. Wilson Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge

Introduction:

This section documents the transactional analysis of fourteen roughly categorized existing theoretical and practical resources. The resources analyzed are either a body of scientific knowledge, vetted theoretical framework, or accepted praxis. The list of resources is not claimed to be complete. For clarity, all the various disciplines of the natural sciences are counted as one resource. As described in the Research Scope and Approach, the transactional method applied here, is a “mindfully reflexive” analysis wherein an exchange occurs between the resource and the structure for problem solving. In this case, the structure is the communicative framework and the currency of exchange is either intellectual or practical. The point of a transactional exchange is to do more than simply situate the research in the literature, but to also draw novel insights as guided by the problems and solutions. It is a form of transactional analysis in the spirit of Rosenblatt when she recognizes that “relationships take place in a context that also enters into the event” (Rosenblatt, 1988, p. 4).

Vertical Integration:

An important goal of this transactional analysis is to set up a structure that will ultimately support Vertical Integration of science and the humanities. Vertical Integration is a fairly recent idea to emerge and primarily from the philosophy of science, sociology, and cultural studies. Vertical Integration refers to the reordering of knowledge, bodies of knowledge, or any other intellectual resource for that matter, in a way that connotes an

interactive relationship (Curras, 2002; Slingerland, 2008). The goal in this study is to blaze a path that proceeds vertically from positivist science, up to constructivist humanities.

Each theory, praxis, or body of knowledge, hereinafter called resource, in the following transactional analysis was purposefully selected for its implicit relevance to the subject or potential for fruitful insight. Each transactional event, or reading, begins with a very brief description of the resource, the rationale for its selection, and a preview of what it offers the research. In most cases, to understand how the resource is integrated into the framework, the reader will need to advance to the next resource. It is this very stepwise progression that is the work of Vertical Integration.

Once Vertical Integration is realized, the purposeful ordering of resources becomes useful. The hierarchical design, although imperfect, trends from the objective-positivist domains of knowledge, toward the subjective-constructivist domains of practice. This movement across a landscape of boundaries is meant to demonstrate that although the two disparate end-members, science and the humanities, have been historically walled-off from each other; there are reasonable and meaningful ways to integrate them.

By virtue of the diversity of resources required, this transactional analysis is inevitably a boundary-crossing survey. Thus, the potential to identify consilient insights is highly increased as they are gleaned from across the sciences and humanities domains.

The Natural Sciences:

The knowledge gained through the natural sciences forms the foundation of the communicative framework that this project seeks to articulate. Scientific knowledge, in this sense, is the body of knowledge accumulated through the practice of science primarily to understand the processes of nature.

Already the first demarcation has arrived. Where does nature end and culture begin? To this study, the question is technically meaningless. If we were to keep with the basic assumption of this project, the natural sciences would extend inevitably into the social, cultural, behavioral science, and continue right through the humanities. The question shall remain outside the formal scope of this study. However, in the interests of clarity, it seems most reasonable to conform to the landscape in which this thesis will be received. Thus we are forced to “construct” a temporary boundary in order to avoid the charge of relativism. A working operational definition of the natural sciences includes physics, astronomy, chemistry, biology, anthropology, and the subset of “hard” disciplines that have emerged from them. As will be seen, it is the content of the natural sciences, revealed as woven into a meaningful human narrative that becomes the central theme of this framework. The key question is how we personally respond to that knowledge, and integrate it into the life experience.

This process and direction is not new. Science historian Jacob Bronowski reminded us of the fuller role of science as synthesizer in society when he wrote:

“Science analyzes experience, yes, but the analysis does not yet make a picture of the world. The analysis provides only the material for the picture. The purpose of science, and all rational thought, is to make a more ample and more coherent picture of the world in which each experience holds together better and is more of a piece. This is a task of synthesis, not of analysis” (1977, p. 253).

But what are new, are the social contexts and technological risks of the contemporary world. In this framework, the natural sciences retain their status as the best source of natural knowledge. The dedicated empiricist might well be content to view this as the realization of a reductionist agenda – if there could be such a thing. But even that would sell science short. As we continue along under the pull of our fullest natural endowment, we may catch the first glimpse of personally actualized meaning.

The potential to integrate the content of science is as deep and rich as scientific knowledge itself - but no richer. The ethos of skepticism and anti-embellishment applies in full force. Suffice to say, in this arrangement, epistemology, ontology, and axiology, are already linked and in that order, so the question then becomes; how they are integrated into the communicative framework? Each field of the natural sciences has a chapter to contribute to the cosmic narrative and to the higher order values of science.

For example, the field of geology offers a glimpse of the immensely long sweep of Earth history as human history. It reveals the dramas that unfolded on our world for over four-

billion years, long before even a hint of humanity. Scientifically derived geologic timescales, incomprehensible as they are to human perception, do tend to bring a geologist face to face with the reality of our relatively short and tenuous existence on this planet. Only by contemplating the vast narrative of the world before us, can one appreciate the very real prospect of a world after us, read without us. There can be profound human values embedded in geologic strata. For example, one might derive an appreciation of the uniqueness of humankind to have accomplished so much in so little time. Or perhaps by knowing the evolutionary history of once ubiquitous and dominant creatures, such as the dinosaurs, one might see how being ubiquitous and dominant is no guarantee of long-term survival. Or even a prolonged encounter with a geologic time chart could bring into focus the wanton negative impact of our species in an inescapably short wink of time and compel an individual to reexamine the impact of their own modern lifestyle. The point here is that geology, currently conceptualized as a science subject, is not typically called upon to instill long-term sustainable values for humanity. This thesis argues that it could, and should be by the following rationale: Geology as a natural science is, in practice, quintessentially positivistic. But geology in a human context and given a constructivist treatment as suggested here, can instill us with a perspective of natural scales that are imbued with humanitarian values.

This positivist-constructivist rationale can be extended to all of the natural sciences. In this vein, each field provides a new bricolage of untapped opportunities for realigning our values into better accordance with natural order. For example, astronomy can instill a sense of the uniquely rare situation of planet Earth and it’s inhabitants. Chemistry can

foster an appreciation for the inventive tenacity of molecular processes shared by living organisms, connecting us to them. Physics can provide access to the notion of the staggering improbability that there exists anything at all and hence what we have is precious and should be preserved. In any case, this exercise simply demonstrates a process by which we can coalesce positivistic science and constructivist values.

For now the point may just be to ensure we are firmly rooted in what we think we know through science. The process may eventually meander into areas of inquiry less well established or even downright absurd. But this is assumed to be part of the nature of inquiry. Basic science, unencumbered by economics and ideology is entrusted to retrieve us should our imaginations and self-posturings venture below the horizon of reason. It should be noted that the ability and willingness of this scientist to make such a concession is itself a manifestation of the transformative process this study seeks to communicate. But it also betrays the enfolded and systemic nature of the dysfunction that needs to be addressed.

Science Studies

Science studies is an umbrella term to incorporate the history, philosophy, sociology, epistemology, and ethos of science. Since science knowledge forms the foundation of the framework we are developing, science studies are a critical component. Historical analysis of the human development of science, especially moments of revolution and controversy, are required to understand what science is, how it advances, and where it

interfaces with society. The philosophy of science considers the trends in thought about science including, logic, rhetoric and metaphysics. The sociology of science examines the internal social structures and practices of the enterprise of science. The epistemology of science centers its analysis on the methodologies and practice of science to reveal the limits of induction and demarcation issues, while the ethos of science refers to the set of principles established to guide the endeavor of science. The current project seeks to articulate opportunities for the insights of science studies to be assimilated into culture. Since this is an endeavor to draw personal meaning and human values, it should be clear that simple objective empirical analysis would not be adequate – but then neither is defaulting naively to domains of unscientific knowledge. Although the sociology of other fields such as economics, art, sports, etc. are important to intellectual and cultural development, science may trump them as the only one crucial to a healthy techno- scientific democracy. Indeed science, when misunderstood or applied, is the only subject with potentially existential implications. Thus this framework seeks to emphasize an understanding of how good science advances, and to extrapolate those ideals toward sustainable social good – specifically through science communication.

The humanistic thrust of the ethos of science makes it a particularly a useful component for a culture that according to Robert Merton, has for too long been neglected (1973). Merton’s codification of the ethos of science, although refined by recent philosophical trends, serves as an appropriate starting point. In his book, The Sociology of Science, he writes that “Four sets of institutional imperatives - universalism, communism [later called communalism], disinterestedness and organized skepticism – are taken to comprise the

ethos of modern science” (Merton, 1973, p. 270). There should be public concern if these principles seem to be waning.

The assumption that there are humanitarian values inherent in the sociology of science becomes clearer when one considers them in cultural contexts. A highly-simplified view of how the Merton’s imperatives might appear on culture would view universalism – the acceptance of truth claims as they arise from observation and in consonance with confirmed knowledge – as a means for disengagement from the entanglements of race, class, religion, nationality, and other personal qualities of the protagonist. This rings true with pluralistic democratic, civil, and humanistic values. Merton’s claim that “Ethnocentrism is not compatible with universalism” (1973, p. 271) extends universalism’s reach into environmental issues in as much as they reach the scale of critical ills – which as already been argued. Communalism acknowledges the shared ownership, rights, and responsibilities associated with scientific knowledge. When this is projected culturally it serves to promote justice, fairness, and sense of community. As an example, there are, it seems, ongoing opposing dynamics inherent in current economic markets and perhaps recent events are reflecting the systemic divergence from Merton’s original thinking. The ideal of disinterestedness, when scaled-up to culture, faces the formidable challenge of potential opposition to deeply held beliefs. This process is argued to be central not only to the purpose of the proposed framework, but also the root cause of many of our the critical ills it seeks to ameliorate. This highly simplified description serves to remind and alert the reader of its place in this project. The implications of “wishful thinking” will be addressed in the conclusions. The ability to

temporarily suspend judgment asked for here is reflected in the final Mertonain principle of the ethos of science; organized skepticism. Organized skepticism in science refers the methodological and institutional mandate to practice due patience and fair scrutiny of knowledge claims. Writ-large, this skill may offer opportunities to unite where the “cleavage between the sacred and the profane” (1973, p. 277) has otherwise been institutionalized.

The fruits of this self-imposed regulation may explain the relatively low levels of fraud and plagiarism in science as compared with other domains. Unfortunately this description is adequate only with respect to the traditional model of “academic science.” In our time we have witnessed the emergence of a different model of science characterized by dependence on huge financial resources, privatization and secrecy of research, commodification of research results, bureaucratization of scientific institutions and instrumentalization of science by subjecting it to extra-scientific interests (Sztompka, 2007).

Schick and Vaughn’s “Criterion of Adequacy” (Schick & Vaughn, 2005, p. 187), although meant primarily to assess and decide on the explanatory value of competing hypotheses, offers similar opportunities for cultural assimilation of the ethos of science. In particular, the criterion of “fruitfulness,” as a measure of a hypothesis’ ability to “successfully predict new phenomena and thus open up new line of research” (2005, p. 190) is in keeping with the pragmatic theme of this study. In this interpretation, a thing is “true” in as far as it works and can, if successful, go on to initiate new research programs.

Schick and Vaughn cite Lakatos’ special admiration of those research programs that allow fruitful hypotheses to make “dramatic, unexpected, and stunning predictions; a few of them are enough to tilt the balance; when theory lags behind the facts” (Schick & Vaughn, 2005, p. 190). The point is, when the status quo is showing signs of serious dysfunction, we should remember that novel solutions can often arise from unexpected ideas if given the “right” attention. Other criteria offered by Schick and Vaughn, such as scope and simplicity offer similarly usable ideas to keep in mind as we scan existing theories for new solutions to old critical ills.

These treatments of Merton’s Ethos of Science and Schick and Vaughn’s Criterion of Adequacy are not meant to be comprehensive and they are by no means the first.
These types of ruminations are integral to the philosophical process of the current study. They appear in the framework as an abiding awareness of the two-way directional quality of the science-society interaction. That is to say, not only can social ideals be brought to the sciences, but so too can the proven ideals of science be projected onto culture. In any case, it is a contention of this project that we need a resurgence in their application across science and society.

Worldview Theory:

In anthropological studies, Worldview Theory provides a structure to map how various peoples think about themselves, their environment, and causal relationships through space and time. It describes how the internal cognitive structures of the individual and the

collective interact with the world. Linking a set of human worldview universals and observing how they play out in the world allows for a dynamic and useful portrayal of culture. The cultural anthropologist Micheal Kearny presents a model of worldview as dealing with “culturally organized macrothought – those dynamically interrelated basic cognitive assumptions of a people that determines much of their behavior and decision making” (Kearney, 1984, p. 1). In an attempt to establish a theoretically sound model of worldview that would be useful for cross-cultural analysis, Kearney developed what he calls “universal cognitive categories” or simply, worldview universals (1984, p. 65). Kearny’s worldview universals are meant to minimize distortion across socio-cultural differences by describing the most basic properties of human perception. The analogy he offers is that of the medical diagnostics known as vital signs. Given the limitations of human anatomy, physicians can depend on common measures of; blood pressure, pulse, respiration rate, etc. to diagnose a range of human patients within acceptable limits.

Kearny describes seven diagnostic “Worldview Universals” which can be summarized as follows:

Self – The default awareness of oneself as distinct from the outside world Other – An awareness of an the environment discernible from the Self Relationship – An awareness of a dynamic link between Self and Other Classification – The requisite Self-Other cognitive differentiation of entities Causality – The requisite awareness of Relationship with Self-Other

Space – An awareness of constancy and change in location

Time – An awareness of constancy and change in process

With this basic list Kearney developed a logical structure that would integrate these universals into a pragmatic and empirical framework for cross-cultural analysis. The resulting system of ordering the “dynamic interrelationships among its elements” is what Kearny calls “logic-structural integration.” This integration of Worldview Theory expresses its functions in terms of consistencies. That is, it examines what people think and believe to how well those thoughts and beliefs actually cohere to the real world. It is the attention “consistencies” that offers the most potential to this project.

Kearny and others are careful to point out that “no claim is made that this model is in itself capable of always predicting logical or structural symmetries among different types of behavior” (1984, p. 53). But this basic economy of cognitive orientations has several advantages. For one thing, it is drawn from extensive empirical analysis from anthropological studies (Cobern, 1991, 1997; Lawrenz & Gray, 1995; McCabe, 1994) and is a comprehensive model for in linking thinking and action (Lewis, 1998). With respect to the current study, it’s language of internal and external consistency offers a way to become aware of disconnects between belief and knowledge, and reveals how such inconsistencies may translate onto cultural dysfunction.

Of all the ways in which worldview describes and interprets the human outlook, its most useful function for the current project is how it accounts for its own manifestations in the physical world. To meet this requirement, Kearny incorporates two primary types of

cognitive consistency - internal and external. Internal inconsistency results from contradictions intrinsic to the holder.

Internal inconsistencies can arise when the cognitive assumptions or images from one historic era are retained into another in which a novel social order has arisen. For example, people of the modern world still refer to “sunrise” and “sunset” even though few would characterize their understanding of the phenomenon as the sun actually rising and setting. Since the real knowledge conforms to the real solar system, internal inconsistencies such as this must lodge locally between two universals in the same head and thus don’t appear to cause much trouble. These types of universal-universal misalignments typically go unchallenged and as such result in only minor disturbances. With the real world tending to push back toward consistency, one could simply ignore it until it “goes away.”

External inconsistencies are significantly more problematic. Kearny describes external inconsistency as resulting when “images or assumptions are maladaptive or otherwise inappropriate for the reality the worldview presumptively mirrors” (1984, p. 54). One can easily imagine scenarios where such worldview-world inconsistencies might express in negative ways, locally. For example, if my conception of the external space between self and bottom of the canyon before me is inconsistent, then the consequences could be fatal. Where this scenario becomes especially relevant to the current project is when these external inconsistencies between worldview and world manifest on cultural-scale levels. When we provide the power of a technological society to a cultural-level external

inconsistency, we approach the possibility of realizing potentially existential outcomes. This is a scenario is Ulrich Beck’s “Risk Society” (Beck et al., 1992) (i.e. collapse of civilization) and thus justifies a sense of urgency in this issue.

A structured awareness such as the logico-structural model of worldview universals obviously sheds light on why people(s) think, believe, and act the way they do. But it also eloquently and comprehensively self-informs on an individual level, of how our own conceptions manifest in the world – giving us another impetus to transform.

Worldview is useful in making visible the contrasts between scientific and non-scientific worldviews. But it should be highlighted that its function here is not to determine whether a worldview is scientific or not. The real utility is in its power to reveal what might not be sustainable at the scales of contemporary culture. This distinction should not be overlooked because it highlights a nuanced but crucially important overture of this project. That is, not promoting one worldview over another. In this sense Worldview Theory provides an excellent framework for situating the ideas of the current inquiry because, much like Deweyan constructivism, it abolishes irresponsible presuppositions about social and moral values of a worldview.

This is not a study with the aim of asserting or reasserting the authority of science in the social world. The integrity and success of science is already assumed. This is about the way in which the integrity of science is delivered to society. The universals of Space and Time offer especially useful concepts with respect to sustainability because, unlike the

other five, they can be acquired in the daily course of cultural interaction. Self, Other, Classification, Relationship, and Causality, all require social interaction. Space & Time on the other hand, are unique in that they are only accessible (with scalar accuracy) through science and communication. It is then, I argue, non-trivial that these two universals, because they are inadequately communicated, are linked to persistent deficiencies in unsustainable worldviews. This point has much meat on it and suggests that our understanding of worldview needs to be refined in light of external inconsistencies. Thus this research aims understand the intersection of worldview formulation and the enculturation of science. This is not argued from an idealistic stance. The job of science is still to produce knowledge and knowledge alone. However, we may wish to reconsider how we make this knowledge more readily available for the construction of worldviews with higher external consistency. What a receiver does with knowledge is admittedly outside the scope of this thesis and may indeed be outside of our hands in any case.

Communicative Action:

Communicative Action Theory is a sub-theory of Social Theory articulated by Jürgen Habermas. According to Habermas, social reality arises out of fundamental building blocks that he calls Communicative Actions (Habermas, 1985). Communicative Actions negotiate the social norms for living out of common definitions that are agreed to by social actors. In this system, speech that is “non-distorted” becomes the imperative and only such pure Communicative Actions have the ability to bring about the mutual

understandings necessary for cultural wellbeing. The theory of Communicative Action places language-mediated communication between social actors at the center of sustainable culture.

By locating its rationalizations in the fine structures of interpersonal linguistic communication, a Communicative Action approach further serves this project by transferring the focus of a general criticalist stance from the broader structures of science content and knowledge, to how that knowledge pans out in experience. Douglas Wilson concludes, “The grand synthesis which Habermas hoped to accomplish based on the notion of communicative action was to bring together social science's two dominant perspectives: society from the micro perspective of an aggregate of actors; and society from the macro perspective as relationships between structural components” (1991, p. 6). Thus, if the goal of Communicative Action in Social Theory is identity liberation and social emancipation, then the goal of Communicative Action in Science Studies can be thought of as the amelioration of cultural ills. Wilson provides an analogous application of Communicative Action as the so-called “tragedy of the Commons” (D. Wilson, 1991), which is a symptomatic part of the more fundamental problems identified in the introduction of this project.

The ideas of Communicative Action are important to this project because they require greater attention to the personal transactions of communication and how they can affect individual and social action. Since the goal of this project is to use a communicative framework to redress cultural-level barriers, it should be seen how the resources of

Habermas’s theory would be useful in fostering new personal meanings and coordinating action towards social integration through a renewed transmission of cultural knowledge.

Conceptual Change:

Conceptual change theory concerns itself with the cognitive processes involved in the formulation and modification of personal ideas – concepts. Concepts are the currency of thought. They can be simple one-word representations for objects or phenomena, such as “bird.” Or they can be linked associations of singular concepts, such as “birds” and “sing” which anticipates that “birds sing.” Concepts and conceptual association can therefore serve as the “building blocks” for increasing complexity, intelligence and the understanding of abstraction (Zirbel, 2006, 2004). Since this research seeks to foster a new conceptualization of the idea of “science,” it should have something to offer this project. Conceptual change theory provides validation and a framework for approaching the task. It calls for certain sensitivities by raising our awareness of conceptual dynamics. It also brings forth related ideas about motivation to learn – which is just another way of saying building a new concept or changing an existing one. The key term is motivation. The delimitation section above included substantial efforts to distinguish between “science literacy” and “science appreciation.” The focus on appreciation of science adds both a subjective and conceptual quality that effectively removes itself from the realm of purely empirical science. It allows us to more closely examine and address an individuals emotional desire to want to change. Why this is important will become clear when we discuss the resources of affective response and cognitive metaphor theory. This is a

needed opening up of potential, but in doing so, it burdens itself with added complexity, expanded scope and the troublesome ambiguities of nuance.

This “fuzziness factor” inherent in conceptual work has been a contentious issue, especially in those areas of inquiry that come into contact with science. There is perhaps no clearer example of this situation than cognitive neuroscience. There has been a recent upsurge in practical theory emerging from cognitive neuroscience. It might not be simple coincidence with the rise in awareness of cultural dysfunction. This project, by assuming that cultural dysfunction is essentially personal cognitive dysfunction writ large, places cognitive neuroscience as central to its thesis. Since this study seeks to change the conceptualization of science, it draws heavily on the insights of the cognitive theory.

To appropriately scale what is asked of conceptual metaphor theory to what it is capable of providing This paper will limit it’s use to the current thinking in cognitive conceptual metaphor theory as it applies to normative perceptions of science. For example, here I apply Gigerenzer and Goldstein’s notion of the “fast and frugal” heuristic not quite as they do, to rational decision-making processes (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996), but to affective response to science and conceptual change.

Transformative Learning theory:

While the term “transformative learning” has many informal meanings in education studies, here it refers to the movement initiated by Jack Mezirow (Mezirow, 1981, 1994,

1997, 2000) and its continued refinement up to the present (Adarkar & Keiser, 2007; Glisczinski, 2007; Goulah, 2006; Imel, 1999; Jackson, 2008; Kitchenham, 2008; Mezirow, 1997, 2000; E. W. Taylor, 1997, 2008). The theory has become something of a chimera, and like conceptual change theory, now overlaps several of the ideas synthesized in this project. This tendency may be indicating that some integration is already naturally overdue and it seems especially true, as should be expected, toward the middle of the science-humanities spectrum – which is where we currently are in this project.

Mezirow identified “perspective transformation” As the process of becoming critically aware of how and why our assumptions have come to constrain the way we perceive, understand, and feel about our world; changing these structures of habitual expectation to make possible a more inclusive, discriminating, and integrating perspective; and, finally, making choices or otherwise acting upon these new understandings" (Cranton, 1994, p. 22). One need only imagine this process as it might apply to public perceptions of science to see its attractiveness to the current project. It should also make sense that Transformative Learning would be something of a moving target - it itself is transforming.

Mezirow viewed the process of transformative learning as primarily “epistemic”rational and a critical one whereby the adult learner becomes aware of their unconscious roles, beliefs, and assumptions. This leads to a constructive “self-authoring” phase of development in which one sets aside the uncritically assimilated values and meanings of

one’s social environment, and instead learns to form new ones for themself. Mezirow viewed this as crucial to the proper functioning of a democracy predicated on freedom. Mezirow’s view has been critiqued for its nearly exclusive emphasis on the role of rational reflection in promoting its change in perspective while other scholars have argued that emotional and intuitive factors must be given equal weight. This division toward human emotion is in keeping with the current project.

The context of transformative learning used in this study draws on the idea not as much as a theoretical one but as a phenomenological one. Duerr et al. quotes the Harvard psychologist Robert Kegan as saying “transforming our epistemologies, liberating ourselves from that in which we are embedded, this is the most powerful way I know to conceptualize the growth of the mind.” (Duerr, Zajonc, & Dana, 2003)

I should be noted that a considerable cottage industry has emerged surrounding the powerful insights of transformative learning. Although a few of these “transpersonal definitions” have garnered substantial followings outside of academia, most mainstream educational works looks to traditional cognitive science for insight and theory. That there may be a growing appetite for innovation in thinking notwithstanding, this study seeks to remain connected to traditional academia by limiting claims and focusing primarily within peer-reviewed published literature.

Affective Domain and Motivation:

The affective domain refers to that part of the learning process that is stimulated or otherwise encouraged by being associated with an emotional response. It is typically considered part of Krathwohl’s (2002) revised version of Bloom’s original taxonomy of learning (Bloom et. al 1956). One study that suggests that motivation to succeed in career is highest motivator off college performance (Glynn & Koballa Jr, 2006). The overall taxonomy structures a triad of domains; the cognitive, affective, and psychomotor, as key elements of effective learning. In this scheme, motivation to learn is an important component. There are numerous sub-theories within affective domain but the basic idea is that the association strengthens either motivation or retention of content knowledge or both. Although the taxonomy primarily targets cognitive development, its methods and secondary goals involve attitudes, motivations, and values. Since the current project seeks changes in these same domains, the theory has much important insight to offer.

It is an interesting point that although virtually all of the research in affective domain for science education, even when it seeks attitudinal change, still ultimately prioritizes content acquisition and retention. This is to be expected in the education literature of course but the observation does confirm the aforementioned “deficit-driven” quality of this project. One recent article that came very close to our subject was Littledyke (Littledyke, 2008), which specifically targeted the integration of cognitive and affective domains improving science education and environmental awareness. Littledyke reasoned

similar sentiments to those argued in this project for science by claiming the importance of a “sense of relationship” with the object of environmental education. It is clear and not surprising that we have both arrived at similar viewpoints. Littledyke is also clearly consistent with the Deweyan perspective on promoting relational and systems thinking (Dewey, 1916). Littledyke also supports that careful exploration into post-modern constructivist teaching and touches on the inexorable connections between affective response and teacher language and actions (performance culture is covered below), experiential and active learning.

The affective domain lies at the center of another profound threshold. It is a subject matter that falls distinctly astride a boundary. It was at this point that the transactional analysis seemed to encounter the titration point between the science and humanities.

Cognitive Metaphor Theory:

The standard conceptualization of science would be the typical “elevator pitch” description of science, or the description one might get by asking random people on the street “What is science?” It must be understood however, that although a conceptualization such as this might provide initial insight into ones deeper ideas, such a superficial characterization must be considered as embedded in more complex webs of understanding and opinion. If the initial thought called up by the word science is a persons “concept” of science, then the assortment of collected beliefs, meanings, understandings, and attitudes, may collectively be thought of as a shorthand narrative – or

cognitive metaphor. I will discuss this topic of conceptual metaphor in depth later, but for now the point is to distinguish between what is typically considered the primary values of science; “literacy” or “technological savvy” etc. with that which is being championed here, which is a new personally meaningful conceptualization or metaphor for science. It is also argued that there is an underappreciated and insidious exchange between the prevailing conceptualization of science and all facets of contemporary culture.

This is not the standard approach to framing science. In other words, this is not an application of framing research to controversial topics, or rhetoric to persuade in one direction over another in communicating to the public about issues of science. This is more about encouraging a broad assimilation of the “ethos of science” or the “perspective of science” into culture. A critical distinction is made between the utilitarian appreciation of science and the personally meaningful one.

Thus, the electrical fire returns again and again until someone switches off the breaker. I think we have the potential to understand where this conflict comes from. It is the inherently conservative stance of science, the same stance that gives science its power provisionality. This is a fundamentally different use of conceptual framing based on the depth, or breadth of the frame. For example, when Nesbit characterizes the reframing event that led to a “favorable” result in the Dover Delaware ID controversy as “public accountability” reasoning (i.e. why should a public institution bear the burden of the legislating the mandatory teaching of ID, thus risk getting sued, to serve the agenda of a small group with specific interests - the religious fundamentalists who hijacked the

school board for that specific purpose in the first place) we overlook and thus miss, and opportunity for more systemic change. Nesbit and others present a version of framing aimed at resolving scientific controversy. But this somewhat myopic view limits its function to navigating selected subjects in science (stem cell research, evolution and creationism, global warming, etc). But never does it acknowledge or attempt to address the root source of the controversy. So although the result may be superficially “favorable” with respect the controversy of the immediate issue, if ails to solve the problem on a sufficiently deep level and instead allows the initial misconception to persist. That is, the previously established pattern of unscientific-macro thought that results in fundamentalist school board hijackings in the first place. It lacks melioration; assuming scientists share That hydra will return. Thus, I am arguing that the reframing treats the symptom, not the root cause. A predictable response to my assertion here, is that it is either too difficult, or even impossible to address such the engrained idiosyncratic cognitive patterns of people. Perhaps, but for an academe that reserves its highest regard and allegiance to the power of evidence, I suggest we consider the findings of the numerous science literacy assessment reports cited in this paper as the body of evidence. If we are ever to solve this problem it is inevitable that we address it on its most fundamental level. Otherwise we are condemned to a reactionary and eternally inadequate effort – more difficult by any measure. So lets just get it done now. It’s important to remember that the version for framing (or reframing) science that I am championing here differs greatly from the prevailing practice used in education, navigating controversial issues, politics, and decision-making. This version is different because it is not about influencing a specific result or response. It’s about garnering the

most reasoned, accurate (read scientific) response and allowing the attendant ethos to “trickle up” into culture. It is not an agenda-driven processes but a validity-driven process not to manipulate the facts, but to offer a novel, more meaningful response to those facts. The thrust of this idea rests not on redefining the methods of science on reframing how we can better assimilate the fruits of that process. In his exceptionally effective landmark book and television series, Carl Sagan reframes science as “the way the universe comes to know itself.” Sagan’s widow, Ann Druyan, reframes science as the path to “soaring spiritual high.” If it’s reasonable to assume that the more successful a civilization gets, the less room there is for self-delusion, then to reframe issues as simply, economic, politically correct, or anything less than existential, is inherently unsustainable and ultimately jeopardizes civilization.

Embodied Cognition:

Embodiment theory, or more specifically, embodied cognition, is an emerging framework that places most if not all of the practical functioning of the human mind under physical constraints. It seeks to understand the mind - its thoughts, ideas, concepts, and resultant behaviors, in terms of a biological system that has evolved through natural processes. Naturalizing the human mind in order to change the fundamental ways in which we perceive ourselves as integral to nature is an intriguing idea, albeit it one fraught with obstacles.

If embodied cognition holds true, it implies that only by first acknowledging that the mind is inescapably attached to the physical world via a physical body, can we put it to use. If the mind originates in the brain, then all of the functioning mind can theoretically be understood through an encompassing understanding of the literal nature of the brain – which is a job for science. Indeed, much progress has been made through the reductive process to understand the physical workings of the brain. In What the Science Offer the Humanities; Edward Slingerland approaches the embodied theory of mind from the humanities side. What is relevant to the current project is how he admits that the humanities has “wrapped itself in an impenetrable shell of Verstehen [understanding, as opposed to explanation] and violently resists any attempt by the natural sciences to breach the boundary” (Slingerland, 2008). His work not only confirms that there is a major schism, but also reveals that most of the work must be done on the humanities side of the divide. It seems reasonable that professional humanists would be more inclined to reject science than the other way around when one considers that even scientists are human. Even the strictest of empiricists is still a human and thus would have “intuitive access to human-level structures of meaning.” (Slingerland, 2008, p. 299) whereas a top echelon humanist need not have any exposure to science. Slingerland points out however that most practicing humanists are already engaged with reductionism to some degree whether they care to admit it or not. His findings and reasoning’s serve as this project’s mandate to seek inroads between science and the humanities. And the project’s method is to seek opportunities to draw on the humanities to communicate science. Abandoning such deeply entrenched dogmas such as “the ‘blank slate’ theory of human nature, strong versions of social constructivism and linguistic determinism, and the ideal of

disembodied reason” (Slingerland, 2008, p. 302). These abandonings indeed represent the progress to be made by erasing dualisms.

It perhaps worth remembering in at this point that is not the aim of this project to advance the science or theory of mind. It is simply to scan the body of knowledge and see if some synthesis of ideas and practice may emerge to in someway lead to the amelioration of suffering. In this sense, embodied cognition, like many of the previous resources, serves mostly to raise our awareness and sensitivities in order to better communicate the higher order values of science.

Humanities:

This section turns to the humanities in general (arts, literature, music, etc.) for help in formulating the communicative framework. The humanities have traditionally been called upon to nourish the human sense of meaning. But as “modern humanities” have lost so much of their moral authority to the forces of political correctness and the threat of the charge of relativism, culture seems to have lost much of the humanities as a source for deep meaning. This leaves little other than religion and other supernatural trappings.

So what is the cost of losing the full thrust of the humanities in constructing human meaning? In “What Science Offers the Humanities” Slingerland highlights the extent of the humanities slippery, confused, and relativist footing when he critiques Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of “natural taste” (Bourdieu & Nice, 1990, p. 6). Natural Taste in this

instance serves as a prime example of how the modern humanities have separated themselves for the science dialog. According to Slingerland, Bourdieu’s “natural taste” is that ineffable postmodernesque preference for certain “aesthetic” qualities as opposed to the chemical interactions of specific molecules on the tongue that trigger a neurological sequence of taste.

Bourdieu then enlists the idea of “habitus” which essentially refers to the historical course of one’s upbringing as it pertains to the tastes that one develops. As Slingerland sees it, Bourdieu’s historicity lacks depth of history. The problem is not that Bourdieu’s humanistic rigor is insufficiently analytical or overly historist, but that “it has an overly superficial and myopic conception of what history is” (2008, p. 96). The obvious question becomes, where might Bourdieu find the added depth of history? Slingerland suggests, and I agree, the natural sciences, and in this case, human evolution is a truly natural start. This is one example of science-to-humanities integration. The point of this project is to support integration by also supporting the call for integration of humanities- to-science.

Perhaps the most compelling example relates back to the seemingly intractable problem of the Selfish Gene (Dawkins, 1976). The issue, as Dawkins perceives it, stems from the purely objective realization that humanity is simply a slave to genes. It is the genes that seek to survive and the human, complete with all that we cherish about being human, is merely the most effective vehicle for the “robot replicators” to survive. The current project makes no specific value assertion on this idea except to ask whether the Dawkins

interpretation is also just a metaphoric interpretation - a narrative based on the science. Where is the humanities version? Slingerland offers an underappreciated role for the humanities in alleviating the anxiety a chapter he calls “Confronting Darwin’s Dangerous Idea” (2008). The reality, Slingerland points out, is that both science and the humanities must realize that it is the humanities that can save us from the terror of replicating robots. But it is the humanities themselves that must realize this, integrate science, and then take on their humanistic responsibilities from their position at the top of the hierarchy. If they don’t science retains its authority, the humanities continue to spiral out of relevance, superstition flourishes, and the replicating robots win.

Narrative:

One need only try to imagine what poetry, literature, art, music, and theater, would be without storytelling. With the possible exception of highly abstract forms, the humanities would simply cease to exist. Narrative is a defining component of the human experience, as old and unique as humanity itself. Most if not all of the humanities hinge on successful narrative and we have accumulated a vast legacy of resources and wisdom to tell stories. It is also important to recognize that the construction of a narrative is usually not solely a personal process. It is frequently also a primary element in social interaction; a quality that makes it amenable to communicating science to the public. Very few social communications occur in a narrative vacuum.

So the question of relevance to this study is, what role should narrative play in improving the way science is communicated to the public. The answer is, the same role it plays in

the humanities. Traditionally science has not called on narrative, much less the humanities to communicate itself. Recently however, there has been an increase in research on the role and power of narrative in general education (Carson & Carson , 2002; Gemmell, 2006; Kubli, 2001), and some in science education as well (Grobstein, 2005; Angier, 2008; J. A. Clark, 2006; English, 2008; Martin & Brouwer, 1991; Strube, 1996 ). Narrative is now being positioned as a powerful tool in science education and communication. When we consider narrative as a means of connecting ideas and information into sequences of appeal for a receiver, the value of narrative in education becomes clear. Expertise in narrative offers an ability to evoke emotions, structure engaging flows of information, and deliver powerful epiphanies (Flajšar, 2003; Langbaum, 1983). All of these tools and techniques should be more deliberately brought to the communication of science. But a value that is perhaps even more useful and even more overlooked is narrative as a path to personal meaning making (C. Clark & Rossiter, 2008), and further still, self-identity. As a tool for refurbishing a perception of self as part of a larger narrative is a central goal of this project.

Performance Culture:

Performance culture refers to the structures, styles, and techniques, developed to enhance the practice of human-to-human communication. The typical goal of performance is usually for entertainment purposes but for this research it means the communication of science in addition to enhancing entertainment value. If the boundary between science and the humanities will allow for any consilience, or vertical integration, then it should

also be permeable to knowledge transfer and communication practice. Thus if the natural sciences emanating from the opposite end of the framework serve to accurately inform the science content, then performance culture draws our attention the we act when we present that information.

Phenomenology:

By phenomenology we mean all those forms of thinking which in some way maintain a perspective on the lived human experience. The phenomenological interest is not just methodological but existential as we come to the question of how a life ought to be lived with others. To present research by way of a narrative text is not to present findings, but to do a reading (as a poet would) of a text that shows what it teaches. One must meet with it, go through it, encounter it, suffer it, consume it and be consumed by it.

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS:

The faculty of voluntarily bringing back a wandering attention, over and over again, is

the very root of judgment, character, and will. An education which should improve this faculty would be the education par excellence. But it is easier to define this ideal than to give practical directions for bringing it about. - William James, Principles of Psychology

This section presents and discusses the synthetic integration of the resources above as an integrated framework for the communication of science. A graphical representation is provided where the elements are described as they are integrated and highlights the intended benefits.

Knowledge and praxis from philosophy and epistemology of science (such as critical thinking and critical self-reflection) are linked across the divide to insights from the humanities such as; affect, narrative, epiphanic structure, metaphor, conceptual change, and transformative learning. These insights are linked aesthetically and arranged into a hierarchical conceptualization of science that highlights; connection to nature and the broadening of perspectives of natural scale, empathy, and personal meaning as “higher order values” of science. The author concludes by suggesting praxis for science communication drawn from these original insights.

As the overarching research transaction progressed, a few exceptionally useful theoretical and practical resources emerged from the domains of natural science, pedagogy, the social and anthropological sciences, and the humanities. There is considerable overlap in many of these disciplines so delimiting the boundaries of these fields was frequently problematic (which may reflect an inherent need to unify). Therefore the heading of each subsection should be considered only marginally representative and in some cases nearly irrelevant, as the divisions drawn proved to be highly permeable. With that caveat stated, the primary science resources that emerged as most fruitful were: the natural and sociological sciences, anthropological studies, and science studies. From pedagogy theory; transformative learning, conceptual change, and affective domain (including their impacts on motivation for self-directed learning) were called on repeatedly and in several contexts. From communication theory, the issues of conceptual framing were also exceptionally useful. And finally, from the humanities, narrative theory, metaphor, performance culture and epiphanic structure emerged as useful.

A Novel Frame of Reverence:

Figure 1 is a graphical representation of the resulting communicative framework. The central triangle represents the interlocking theoretical and practical “resources” from the transactional analysis. The three sides of the triangle, labeled; Physical and Natural Sciences, Communication and Pedagogy, and Cultural and Social Studies, roughly correspond to three general domains of knowledge. The vertical arrangement of the various resources is also hierarchical. At the bottom of the triangle are the positivist

sciences. Placing them at the bottom signifies that they are the foundation or source of all the resources higher up. As we move up the hierarchy the resources we move from positivist toward constructivist. There is a trend for vertical integration between the positivist sciences, and the constructivist humanities. Each resource contributes its value to the framework, and serves as an intermediate step toward integration.

The hierarchical triangle of resources is flanked on either side by a “wedge” of values. On the left are the values of science. The top three values, Perspective, Personal Meaning, and Purpose, collectively represent the defined “higher-order values of science.” On the right are the intended outcome values. In either case, as one moves up the hierarchy, the wedge widens; suggesting an increase in the prevalence of that value the further one goes up the framework. This framework can be thought of as reaching out to the humanities; an invitation to take their place at the top of the pyramid.

Presenting science in this hierarchical sequence maintains science’s privilege as the best way of knowing, but takes into account the reality that it may not be the best basis for acting and interacting in sociocultural contexts. By focusing on the latter two, it is hoped that this project will improve the way we communicate science and offer some balance to our approaches for fostering greater participation of public in science and science in public.

Implications:

This framework promotes critical thinking and self-reflection in highly integrated ways. First, since the framework promotes personally meaningful science learning, it is inked to motivation and self directed learning. The framework also seeks to empower the learner and thus can be a liberating force in education and a resource in one’s personal and civic life. The framework promotes critical thinking and self reflection skills by nurturing those dispositions which consistently yield the most useful insights.

This framework issues an implicit challenge to the humanities by encouraging them to assume the top of the hierarchy. If it is true that the humanities deplore the scientific worldview, then this is the opportunity to reassert. Science is vulnerable to the humanities. Humanists must simply turn around and see science as content to be humanized. The humanities are not merely a tool for delivering the knowledge of science. They are that knowledge. Science is the mere tool. When humanists turn their backs to the sciences, they relinquish their responsibility, their talent, and hand the hard-won tool over to the tool itself. The humanities are where the human capital resides, not in the knowledge and technology of science.

If one considers the real and implications of our scientifically known size and place in the universe, why then has science failed to integrate this perspective into culture? Carl Sagan’s “Pale Blue Dot” paradigm shift is needed and this project seeks to extend Sagan’s idea by arguing that science is misappropriated and under utilized in contemporary culture. Most of the time when this is communicated it is met with a

pernicious tendency that seems to altogether miss the point. Perhaps this is simply the nature of paradigm shifts.

Holding the knowledge of the natural sciences as the central narrative thread allows a starting point and a structure to which we can construct the “on-ramps.” The system we create will eventually allow us to examine the space between self and other, positivism and constructivism, science and the humanities. This system offers links from nature to culture. When the knowledge thus far gained by the natural sciences is presented as natural narrative, it also provides a human element that can encourage a student to personally engage with the story. If the solution having emerged pragmatically from the survey of the landscape suggests that dissolving the boundary between people and nature is valid, then the natural cosmology approach should be fruitful. As the story progresses it becomes a cosmology, blurring the boundaries between the disciplines. The blurring is then expanded to all boundaries, but remains rooted in nature. This is the essence of pure pedagogy and a theme that unites the constellation of theories drawn on for this study.

Endnote:

Frequently embedded within the call for improved understanding of science is the term “re-enchantment.” But the term is rarely coupled with a concise or operational definition and even less advice for how to reach it. More often then not, re-enchantment is tinged with objective discouragement. This project does not commit this offense. For the purposes of this project, re-enchantment explicitly means reconceptualizing science content in a way that meets the human need for meaning. The challenge of course, was

doing it in a way that also satisfied the positivist stance that scientists rightly trust and vehemently defend.

If there is any validity in the work conducted in this study, it will have a substantial spectrum of implications on multiple levels. These levels include the personal, community, curricular, institutional, social, and cultural, levels. At the very least, this study will extend our thinking of critical global problems into novel, more imaginative realms of inquiry and understanding.

The dichotomy of science and humanities is endemic to education. By the very nature of our institutional educational approach to science we isolate it from the lives of our students and in turn from our public. On the one hand this is appropriate because science (as a practice) requires a level of topical understanding and technical sophistication that is generally beyond the use of public citizens. Applying the same deficit model to science education we might observe that the qualities that make a good scientist are all too often at odds with the qualities that make a good teacher. Is there some compelling reason we are expecting our best scientists to also be our best teachers? The evidence suggests this might be ill advised.

purposes of this project, re-enchantment explicitly means reconceptualizing science content in a way that meets the human need for meaning. The challenge of course, was doing it in a way that also satisfied the positivist stance that scientists rightly trust and vehemently defend.

This research argues that the central challenge of our time is to recalibrate human self- identity into more sustainable and harmonious accordance with our natural heritage. It is seen fundamentally as a problem of entrenched cultural legacy playing out in ignorant and disproportionately consumptive ways. The dysfunction is maintained in part by a deep disconnect from the perspectives of natural scale. The grand narrative of science, our cosmology, is offered as the one source of values with enough natural scale to fill the need.

This study also argues that the reason this issue is so pernicious may be that the problem is intrinsic to the solution. Without the adequate context, perspective, and personal meaning that would come with an affective response to the scientific narrative (or cosmology), we remain unmotivated to seek out and see science as a source of values. The result is a persistent resistance to exploring core issues. Without a conscientious understanding of this dynamic, communicators tend to either trivialize the science, or sensationalize it. In either case, the long-term result is less understanding and less appreciation of the true value of science.

This thesis is, in a very real sense, and example of the transformation it sought to understand. That is, one of transformative learning. With a background in hard science (geology) I was convinced of the privileged status of scientific knowledge. I remain convinced that all that matters is all that we know, and all that we know, we know through science. But science does not contain all that we experience and all that we experience may not necessarily need to be explained by science. What has changed however is my perception of science’s ability to communicate itself. Science needs the humanities to humanize it, and then communicate it.

So this study charts out the sort of critically self-reflective process I sought to discover. In regard to the educative goals, the endeavor is an enormous success. When I began this study, I saw this framework as emanating out of the sciences alone. I had a limited view of the humanities as simply a distraction from science communicating to what the sciences are telling us. With the growing uncertainty of sciences, I began to see the role of the Humanities becoming more and more integral. This was an unintended conclusion and one that I found exceedingly important and exciting. That I was reluctant made it all the more compelling. My reluctance was same the reluctance I sought to understand and change if a way became visible.

This realization was a breakthrough. I realized I was seeking – an epiphany. The result of this realization changed the most basic outcome of the study by placing itself at the center of it’s own inquiry. It was a witnessing of how true consilience requires the breakdown of old outmoded conceptions and replacement with those more fruitful. My aversion for

dualisms is still intact, even deepened, but what has changed is my outmoded view of the humanities. Where before I saw them an artificial construction and therefore separate from nature, they were part of the problem. Now that I see the plasticity afforded by constructivism, I see that it is not the humanities that are the problem, but it is the humanities disembodied from the human.

This research documents a process imbued with emotion, rhetoric, happenstance, personal bias, manipulation, agenda, and intuition - a list of descriptors most corrosive to science, but like science, distinctly human. So perhaps it is clear why this project needed to take the philosophical form and format that it did. This project cannot justly be called scientific and I know enough about science to avoid sounding like I’m making a scientific claim with it. Nevertheless, in the constructivist model, there are certain things a researcher is entitled to just intuit and it is inevitable, even when it goes unacknowledged, that personal bias enters every human endeavor, scientific or otherwise. This is especially true in this project. Indeed, an experimental design would not have been possible, or even preferable. This project is intrinsically personal, subjective to myself and anyone willing to contemplate what emerges. It is risky to say that... all the more reason to do so.

If we can, for the moment, conclude with a brief thought experiment. Imagine the implications of including human knowledge as part of the “furniture of the universe.” Then there is the possibility that, as goes our knowledge, so goes the universe. In other words, as our knowledge grows and becomes more complex, so to does the universe grow more complex. Through this assertion we can express a deep commitment to

humility, or what Ursula Goodenough calls the “covenant with mystery” (Goodenough, 1998, p. 24). This simple stance allows us to agree that our knowledge may never be complete. Nature, in as much as it can be understood through science, provides the foundational knowledge from which to begin. What the science’s offer this project most is knowledge; pure positivistic empirical knowledge. The endeavor of science has revealed a reasonable and honest depiction of who we are and where we came from. What we do with that knowledge, inwardly and outwardly, is still up to us.

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